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ABSTRACT 
The ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de 
Nuestra América) (Bolivarian Alternative for The People of Our 
America), the command economy alternative to the free trade 
model of globalization, is one of the greatest and least understood 
contributions of Cuba to the current conversation about 
globalization and economic harmonization.  Originally conceived 
as a means for forging a unified front against the United States by 
Cuba and Venezuela, the organization now includes Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Dominica, and Bolivia.  ALBA is grounded in the 
notion that globalization cannot be left to the private sector but 
must be overseen by the state in order to maximize the welfare of 
its citizens.  The purpose of this Article is to carefully examine 
ALBA as both a system of free trade and as a nexus point for legal 
and political resistance to economic globalization and legal 
internationalism sponsored by developed states.  The Article starts 
with an examination of ALBA’s ideology and institutionalization.  
It then examines ALBA as both a trade organization and as a 
political vehicle for confronting the power of developed states in 
the trade context within which it operates.  ALBA remains 
 
* W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, 
Dickinson Law School; Affiliate Professor, School of International Affairs, 
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania; and Director, 
Coalition for Peace & Ethics, Washington, D.C.  The author may be contacted at 
lcb911@gmail.com.  An earlier version of this article was presented at the 
Conference, The Measure of a Revolution: Cuba 1959-2009, held May 7–9, 2009 at 
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.  The conference was jointly 
organized by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Havana University, 
Boston University, and Queen’s University.  Many thanks to my research 
assistant, Alexander Verdugo, Penn State SIA ’10, for his excellent work on this 
project. 
** Associate, Robinson & McElwee, PLLC, Charleston, WV; J.D., 
Pennsylvania State University, May, 2009. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
680 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
embedded in a large web of trade arrangements among its member 
states that bind them in different ways under different 
arrangements.  That context highlights differences, especially in 
relation to MERCOSUR and the abandoned FTAA.  It also 
produces both cooperation and challenge.  This is most acutely felt 
in ALBA’s relationships with CARICOM and in the rising network 
of bilateral investment treaties among regional states.  Taken 
together, for the moment at least, ALBA’s greatest contribution 
might well be its ideology.  Its mere existence serves as a basis for 
challenging assumptions in the creation and implementation of 
methods of integration.  It provides a base through which this 
distinctive ideological voice can be leveraged by its state parties in 
hemispheric integration debates.  It seeks to balance the tensions 
between post-colonial nationalism, internationalism and state 
sector dominance by substituting private markets and private 
actors with state actors and tightly controlled markets.  It is no 
longer focused on eliminating borders for the production and 
management of private capital; instead, it is focused on using 
borders as a site for the assertion of public authority to control all 
aspects of social, political, cultural, and economic activity.  
Understood as an ideological joint venture among its participants, 
ALBA represents a space within which a consensus on alternatives 
to the existing preeminent economic model of globalization might 
be constructed.  As such, it may represent one of Cuba’s greatest 
triumphs and also its greatest challenge to the normative tenets of 
the current framework of economic globalization.  Thus 
contextualized, ALBA serves as a nexus for six great points of 
tension and connection within both modern trade theory practice 
and the construction of state system frameworks in Latin America.  
ALBA implicates tensions between integration and nationalism, 
between public and private models of integration, and between 
internal and external regional trade norms.  It also highlights 
connections between the current form of trade frameworks and the 
construction of alternative forms of trade arrangements, between 
anti-Americanism and integration, and between conventional 
frameworks of Latin American trade and it challengers.  These are 
summarized in the conclusion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra 
América) (Bolivarian Alternative for The People of Our America),1 
the command economy alternative to the free trade model of 
globalization,2 is one of the greatest and least understood 
contributions of Cuba to the current conversation about 
globalization and economic harmonization.  Originally conceived 
as a means for forging a unified front against the United States by 
Cuba and Venezuela,3 ALBA has grown to include Nicaragua, 
Honduras,4 and Bolivia.5  It has also grown to include a number of 
Caribbean states, including Dominica in 2008,6 and St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines in 2009.7  It has the support of other states, 
including Ecuador and Haiti.8  ALBA is meant to provide an 
 
1 See ALBA, Qué es el ALBA? [What is ALBA?], Apr. 28, 2004, 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa 
=showpage&pid=1 [hereinafter ALBA, What is ALBA?] (this and all subsequent 
translations provided by the authors). 
2 For a discussion of the contemporary model of trade and trade regulation, 
see FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY 
OF JUST TRADE 1 (2003). 
3 ALBA, What is Alba?, supra note 1. 
4 ALBA, Declaración de Adhesión de la República de Honduras al ALBA 
[Declaration of Adherence to ALBA of the Honduran Republic], Aug. 25, 2008, 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa 
=showpage&pid=1969. 
5 ALBA, Contribusión y suscripción de la República de Bolivia a la declaración 
conjunta firmada en la Habana el 14 de diciembre del 2004, entre los presidented del 
consejo de estado de la República de Cuba y de la República  Bolivariana de Venezuela 
[Contribution and Subscription of the Republic of Bolivia to the Joint Declaration Signed 
in Havana on December 14, 2004, Among the Presidents of the State Council of the 
Republic of Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela], Apr. 29, 2006, 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=show
page&pid=514 [hereinafter ALBA, Contribution and Subscription of the Republic of 
Bolivia]. 
6 ALBA, Adhesión del gobierno de la Mancomunidad de Dominica al ALBA 
[Adherence of the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica to ALBA], Jan. 26, 
2008, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/pdf/adhesion_mancomunidad_de 
_domin.pdf [hereinafter ALBA, Adherence of Dominica]. 
7 See St. Vincent to Join ALBA, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO’S NEWSDAY, Apr. 23, 2009, 
available at http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,98923.html (“St Vincent and the 
Grenadines was accepted as the seventh ALBA member.”). 
8 See ALBA, V Cumbre del ALBA—Convenio marco de cooperación ALBA-Haiti 
Bolóvar, Petión, Martí [Fifth ALBA Summit, Co-operational Framework of Haiti], Apr. 
30, 2007, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News              
& file=article&sid=1806; see also Rafael Correa, Firma de Convenios Energéticos entre 
la República de Ecuador y la República Bolivariana de Venezuela [Energy Agreements 
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alternative to the conventional trade models of privatization and 
globalization that are assumed to be bad for people, especially for 
those who live in developing states.9 
ALBA is critically grounded on the idea that 
internationalization must be effected through states and public 
action rather than individuals and private markets.  ALBA is not 
necessarily opposed to all private activity, just those activities that 
have become liberated from precise control by the state.  ALBA is 
thus founded on the notion that traditional divisions between 
public and private sectors remains valuable and important, and 
that certain sectors, traditionally overseen by the state as agent for 
territorially based communities, are essential for the maximization 
of the welfare of people organized into states.10  To this is added a 
fundamental distrust of private markets—markets that are not 
strictly controlled and managed by the state.11  In a sense, ALBA is 
compelling for those who control the apparatus of states now 
overwhelmed by new sorts of governance power—private, 
multinational and governance based.  Equally important, ALBA 
now serves as a means of aggregating and institutionalizing 
responses to and challenges of American power in the Western 
Hemisphere.12  ALBA also institutionalizes opposition to the 
 
between the Republic of Ecuador and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela], Jan. 16, 2007, 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa 
=showpage&pid=1412 (relaunching bilateral ties between Ecuador and Venezuala 
through adherence to the ALBA Framework); Jorge G. Castañeda, Latin America’s 
Left Turn, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 28 (2006) (arguing that despite two years of economic 
growth, Latin American politics are leaning towards the left). 
9 For a discussion, see Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant and 
the Crisis of the State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New 
Global Order, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141, 142 (2006) (describing the crisis of state 
systems and states as “the foundational form of global political organization.”). 
10 See ALBA, What is Alba?, supra note 1 (describing the founding principles 
of ALBA). 
11 See ALBA, Fifth Extraordinary Summit of the ALBA Final Declaration, Apr. 17, 
2009, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa   
= showpage&pid=1982 (refusing to approve the agreement produced at the Fifth 
Summit of the Americas and proposing intense debate on the problem of 
capitalism’s exhaustion of the planet and mankind). 
12 Fidel Castro, for example, has been quite vocal about this since the 1980s.  
See, e.g., Fidel Castro Ruz, President, Council of State, Republic of Cuba, Address 
at the Central University of Venezuela, Una Revolución solo puede ser hija de la 
cultura y law ideas, Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente del Consejo de 
Estado de la República de Cuba [A Revolution Can Only be the Child of Culture 
and Ideas] (Feb. 3, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno 
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current framework of economic globalization and attempts to 
challenge the hegemony of the current framework for constituting 
trade among states13—grounded in private economic activity and a 
passive state regulatory role.14 
There is little consensus on the nature and value of ALBA, even 
within the Western Hemispheric community of public and private 
actors.  Some view ALBA as a great threat to the current economic 
order and the political order of states.15  Others view ALBA as little 
 
/discursos/1999/esp/f030299e.html).  These are views refined by the Venezuelan 
leader, Hugo Chavez: 
Nobody can deny that!  Now, I am sure that it was the intent of North 
American imperialism to cause us to fight with our Caribbean brothers; 
we will not fight with Caribbean people, amongst other things, we 
already have Petrocaribe and we are moving towards integration with 
the Caribbean . . . so that we can only move forward always thinking and 
acting according to our strategic and geopolitical plans for the 
integration of South American and Caribbean governments.  This is our 
path!  Nobody will lead us astray . . . ALBA will continue moving 
forward.  ALBA is not just a proposal, ALBA is a proposal that has 
already begun to take effect. 
Hugo Chavez, President, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Discurso al finalizar 
la marcha en apoyo a la política latinoamericana y caribeña y contra el 
imperialismo [Speech at the End of the March Against Imperialism in Support of 
Latin American and Caribbean Politics] (Nov. 19, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/pdf/discurso_chavez.pdf). 
13 For a general discussion of the challenges of sovereign debt from a Cuban 
perspective, see Larry Catá Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: 
Cuba and the IMF, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 497, 497 (2006). 
14 This describes, in general terms, the so-called “’Washington consensus’—a 
consensus between the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury about the 
‘right’ policies for developing countries” on which much current global trading 
frameworks are based.  See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 16 (2002).  “According to the Washington Consensus, growth occurs 
through liberalization, ‘freeing up’ markets.  Privatization, liberalization, and 
macrostability are supposed to create a climate to attract investment, including 
from abroad.  This investment creates growth.”  Id. at 67.  See also Michael Mussa, 
Speech Presented in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Factors Driving Global Economic 
Integration (Aug. 25, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.imf.org/external 
/np/speeches/2000/082500.htm (describing the fundamental factors that drive 
economic integration). 
15 Most prominent among these is the United States: 
The gradual consolidation of democracy remained the dominant trend 
over the last year in Latin America, but a small group of radical populist 
governments continues to project a competing vision that appeals to 
many of the region’s poor.  Indeed, the persistence of high levels of 
poverty and striking income inequalities will continue to create a 
potentially receptive audience for radical populism’s message, especially 
in the less developed areas of Latin America. 
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more than an ideologically curious variation on the large number 
of partial preference free trade agreements that have proliferated in 
Latin America since the 1980s under the Latin American 
Association for Integration (Asociación Latinoamericana de 
Integración, or “ALADI”) framework.16  Still others have suggested 
that there is little, either institutionally or programmatically, that 
distinguishes ALBA from the machinations of the nation states that 
comprise its various disconnected programs.17  ALBA member 
states, of course, view the enterprise as the greatest innovation in 
hemispheric integration since the Soviet Revolution of 1917 by 
combining European Marxism, Latin American nationalist anti-
 
Inspired and supported by Venezuela and Cuba, leaders in Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and—more tentatively—in Ecuador are pursuing agendas 
that undercut checks and balances on presidential power, seek lengthy 
presidential terms, weaken media and civil liberties, and emphasize 
economic nationalism at the expense of market-based approaches. 
Moreover, each of these governments, to varying degrees, has engaged 
in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned with Venezuela and Cuba . . . and 
advocated measures that directly clash with U.S. initiatives. 
Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services 
Committee 110th Cong. 33 (2008) (statement by J. Michael McConnell, Director of 
National Intelligence). 
16 For a discussion of ALADI, see infra Section 2.  The representative of 
Venezuela to ALADI, in 2004, emphasized this view of ALADI as a forum within 
which distinct measures for integration could find a space for debate and 
incorporation.  See ALADI, Incorporación al Comité de Representantes de la señora 
Embajadora María Lourdes Urbaneja Durant [Incorporation of the Committee of 
Representatives the Amabasador María Lourdes Urbaneja Durant], Mar. 24, 2004, 
http://www.aladi.org/nsfaladi/discursos.nsf/vwdiscursosweb/FC5DFABFF7E4
15F403256E6200492A95. 
ALADI is an organization that groups South American countries 
together that is able to and should play a fundamental role in the 
deepening and advancement of this debate in the region. To promote a 
discussion to refresh the models in order to escape the old model and 
create a new model for integration based on economic development that 
intends to promote real development by addressing social exclusion, 
inequality gaps, and strengthening the region’s international presence. 
Id. 
17 See, e.g., Norman Girvan, ALBA, PetroCaribe and CARICOM: Issues in a New 
Dynamic, at 9 (2008), http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009 
/03/alba-petrocaribe-and-caricom.pdf (“ALBA does not take the form of an 
international or inter-governmental organisation, treaty or integration scheme in 
the normal sense.”). 
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colonialism, and the vision of integration that has haunted Latin 
America since the nineteenth century wars of liberation.18 
There is a little bit of truth in each of these views.  The purpose 
of this Article is to carefully examine ALBA as both a system of 
free trade and as a nexus point for legal and political resistance to 
economic globalization and legal internationalism sponsored by 
developed states.  Following this Introduction, I undertake an 
examination of ALBA, focusing on its history, its conceptual basis, 
and its institutionalization.  This Section considers the importance 
of the evolution of Bolivarism in the globalist ideology of Fidel 
Castro and its contribution to the governing ideology of ALBA, 
and its strongly anti-capitalist foundations.  It then considers the 
way in which this governing ideology is institutionalized within 
ALBA.  From the organization of its institutions, the Section turns 
to implementation, considering the way in which ALBA worked so 
far, especially in its economic context.  The Section then examines 
the work of ALBA to date, both as trade organization and as 
political vehicle for confronting the power of developed states, and 
especially that of the United States. 
Section 3 of the Article then contextualizes ALBA within the 
dense network of trade and investment treaties that mark the 
realities of economic relations between Latin American states.19  
The object is twofold; first to examine the extent that ALBA in form 
represents something new, and second to suggest the extent to 
 
18 “Ricardo Alarcón, president of Cuba’s national assembly, has called ALBA 
the best guarantee for the consolidation of an anti-imperialist front.  Addressing 
an international forum in Caracas January 25, Alarcón asked, why waste time in 
looking for answers ‘in the air,’ since ALBA ‘is the answer.’” Sabrina Johnson, 
Cuban People Demonstrate Power of Internationalism, SOCIALIST VOICE, July 17, 2006, 
http://www.socialistvoice.ca/?p=114 (explaining that ALBA represents “a threat 
of a different kind for the U.S. imperialist agenda”).  For a sympathetic application 
of these notions form a Western perspective, see Ugo Mattei, The Peruvian Civil 
Code, Property and Plunder.  Time for a Latin American Alliance to Resist the Neo-
Liberal Order, 5 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 2 (2005) (“In Latin America as elsewhere, 
legal institutions imported from the capitalistic center have legitimized and 
covered up a process of economic and political domination.”). 
19 For a discussion, see VICTOR BULMER-THOMAS, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
LATIN AMERICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 1 (2003) (presenting an overview of economic 
development in Latin America).  These trade webs are not unique to Latin 
America.  For a sense of the complexity of these arrangements, all grounded in the 
current framework of probate markets oriented trade, see Kevin C. Kennedy, The 
Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Sowing the Seeds of False Hopes for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 307 (2005) (discussing injurious impact of the lack of coherence in the 
development, trade, and agricultural policies of the United States). 
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which ALBA in fact provides something different in a field with 
many players.  For that purpose, this Section first contextualizes 
ALBA within conventional trade association organization and 
operation.  That examination reveals organizational differences 
beyond the ideological differences that mark ALBA as distinct 
from conventional trade associations.  However, ALBA’s 
difference, its heavy emphasis on intergovernmentalism, and its 
avoidance of supranational organization, is only a more extreme 
form of the tendencies toward intergovernmentalism that mark 
conventional trade arrangements in Latin America.  Yet differences 
do produce cooperation and challenge.  This is most acutely felt in 
ALBA’s relationship with the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (“CARICOM”),20 which is examined next.  Lastly, ALBA is 
considered within the networks of bilateral trade agreements and 
partial preference trade agreements that mark the landscape of 
Latin American trade relations.21 
ALBA presents an ideological and functional alternative and 
challenge to transnational institutions built on the operating 
assumptions of economic globalization and the developing 
convergence of public and private law.  Originally it was viewed as 
interesting but benign:  “ALBA, a proposed alternative to the 
controversial U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(“FTAA”), presents a socialist vision for regional commercial 
cooperation, although at this point its value is largely political, 
symbolic and somewhat short on economic specifics.”22  Today, the 
 
20 CARICOM, the Caribbean Community and Common Market “was 
established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which was signed by Barbados, 
Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago and came into effect on August 1, 1973.  
Subsequently the other eight Caribbean territories joined CARICOM.  The 
Bahamas became the 13th Member State of the Community on July 4, 1983, but 
not a member of the Common Market.”  See Caribbean Community 
(“CARICOM”) Secretariat, History of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/history.jsp?menu=community (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2010).  For a discussion of the obstacles to swift implementation of 
CARICOM, see Norman Girvan, Towards a Single Development Vision and the Role of 
the Single Economy, at 8 (2007), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market 
/single_economy_girvan.pdf). 
21 See infra Section 3.2. 
22 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, The Economic Rise of Cuba thanks to China, 
Venezuela and Latin Left America, HAVANA JOURNAL, July 31, 2006, available at 
http://havanajournal.com/business/entry/the-economic-rise-of-cuba-thanks-to           
-china-venezuela-and-latin-left-america/.  The Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(“FTAA”) or the Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (“ALCA”) represents a 
long, drawn-out, and still unsuccessful effort to create a hemisphere-wide plan for 
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institution of a number of programs aimed at aiding particularly 
poor states and regions has begun to have effects beyond the 
symbolic.23  ALBA’s potential to provide a public sector variant on 
private sector globalization should not be underestimated.  It is no 
longer focused on eliminating borders for the production and 
management of private capital; instead, it is focused on using 
borders as a site for the assertion of public authority to control all 
aspects of social, political, cultural, and economic activity.  Yet it is 
also deeply embedded in the great web of partial economic 
associations that characterize economic governance in Latin 
America.  ALBA focuses on changing the terms of debate about 
trade, the role of states, and the place of private economic activity 
across borders.  In this respect, certainly, ALBA may represent one 
of Cuba’s greatest triumphs, and also its greatest challenge to the 
normative tenets of the current framework of economic 
globalization.  But the framework within which ALBA can grow 
also sets the limits of its influence.  It is not clear that within a deep 
system of webs of relationships, one variant—a decidedly socialist 
and state-centered one—will change not merely the framework of 
discussion about trade but also the economic philosophy of more 
than a few states in Latin America. 
Thus contextualized, ALBA serves as a nexus for six great 
points of tension and connection within both modern trade theory 
practice and the construction of state system frameworks in Latin 
America.  ALBA implicates tensions between integration and 
nationalism, between public and private models of integration, and 
between internal and external regional trade norms.  It also 
highlights connections between the current form of trade 
 
economic integration in which barriers to trade and investment would be 
gradually eliminated.  Negotiations were formally launched in 1998 and remain 
incomplete.  See Free Trade Area of the Americas, Third Draft FTAA Agreement, 
Doc. No. FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.3 (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.ftaa        
-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp; Free Trade Area of the Americas, 
Antecedents of the FTAA Process, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View 
_e.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (detailing the antecedents of the FTAA process); 
see also infra Section 3.1. (discussing the FTAA in greater detail). 
23 See, e.g., ALBA Seen as Avenue to Economic Aid for Small CARICOM States—
Prof. Vaughn Lewis, STABROEK NEWS, Feb. 3, 2008, available at http://www 
.stabroeknews.com/2008/news/local/02/03/alba-seen-as-avenue-to-economic                 
-aid-for-small-caricom-states-prof-vaughan-lewis/ (arguing the accession of 
Dominica, a CARICOM member, to ALBA was a means of gaining economic aid 
under conditions less rigorous than those available from other sources, including 
the International Monetary Fund). 
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frameworks and the construction of alternative forms of trade 
arrangements, between anti-Americanism and integration, and 
between conventional frameworks of Latin American trade and its 
challengers.  These are examined in the concluding Section of the 
Article. 
2. WHAT IS ALBA? 
ALBA is an alternative approach to economic, social, cultural, 
and political integration that aims to foster trade, development, 
and unity among the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean 
on the basis of a set of principles distinct from those underlying 
conventional integration efforts.24  To the authors of ALBA, 
traditional agreements, such as the FTAA,25 have focused on the 
interests of transnational corporations and capital without taking 
into account the social and economic needs of the people of Latin 
America.26  In contrast, ALBA focuses its emphasis on eliminating 
the social and economic disparities that exist among Latin 
American nations, by creating mechanisms that use cooperative 
advantages that a nation may possess, as a tool to compensate for 
existing disparities among other nations in the region.27  ALBA’s 
primary emphasis is to create a sub-regional bloc built on a 
number of strategic agreements grounded in the founding 
 
24 See ALBA, What is ALBA?, supra note 1. 
25 See Denise Balgobin, FTAA vs ALBA—Choosing Trade Routes, TRINIDAD & 
TOBAGO’S NEWSDAY, June 19, 2008, available at http://www.newsday.co.tt 
/businessday/0,81035.html. 
At a recent luncheon, outgoing Venezuelan Ambassador Christy 
Gonzalez stated that she believed the FTAA formula was oppressive for 
smaller economies, while ALBA or Bolivarian Alternative for Latin 
America and the Caribbean was a more favorable initiative for countries 
in the region.  “ALBA represents the first attempt at regional integration 
based on solidarity, non-interference and complementing, instead of 
competing,” she said. 
Id. 
26 “By employing more effective mechanisms to eradicate poverty, ALBA—as 
proposed by the Venezuelan government—provides a counterweight to the 
policies and goals of the FTAA.  This alternative model also identifies the most 
crucial impediments to achieve a genuine regional integration that transcends the 
prerogatives of the transnational corporations.”  Teresa Arreaza, ALBA: Bolivarian 
Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean, VENEZUELA ANALYSIS, Jan. 30, 2004, 
http://www .venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/339.  See also ALBA, What is ALBA?, 
supra note 1 (detailing the process of ALBA). 
27 ALBA, What is ALBA?, supra note 1 (detailing the process of ALBA). 
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ideology of ALBA—socialist and public law-oriented—for the 
betterment of the peoples in the member states and to serve as 
protection against other states or economic blocs.28  The challenge 
is to provide a space for unified action that can help smaller states 
resist the conventional private enterprise-oriented systems 
represented by conventional trade and integration agreements.29 
This Section first examines the history of ALBA in its regional 
and ideological context.  It starts with the long efforts to find 
methods of integration in a climate in which nationalism is 
privileged.  It then briefly describes the genesis of ALBA as an 
organizational reality formed out of ideological opposition to 
market-oriented globalization. 
2.1. History 
The history of ALBA is in essence a continuation of the history 
of integration in Latin America.  This is a history of tensions and 
interventions.  Integration pits the post-colonial project of state 
building against the internationalist project that aims to reduce the 
sovereign authority of states, both against each other and in their 
relations with private power.  Integration can also serve as a proxy 
for strong state interventions under the cover of private market 
internationalism, and in this way also subvert the post-colonial 
projects of national liberation.  But it can also serve to liberate 
individuals from the oppression of cliques and ideologies that 
hijack the apparatus of states by posing supranational norms 
against narrow assertions of state power.  This Section will begin 
by exploring in greater detail the conflation of these tendencies, 
focusing on the role of Cuba generally, and Fidel Castro 
specifically, in the construction of a novel form of sovereign 
internationalism, producing ALBA.  It then briefly explores the 
efforts that ultimately produced ALBA itself. 
 
28 “For this reason the ALBA proposal gives priority to the integration of 
Latin America and to negotiations of sub-regional blocks, opening new spaces to 
further enhance our understanding of our positions and identify mutual interests 
that permit us to construct strategic alliances and present common grounds in the 
process of negotiation.”  Id. 
29 “The challenge is to prevent dispersion in negotiations, preventing sister 
nations from breaking apart and becoming absorbed in the turmoil that arises 
from the pressure of making quick decisions in accordance with the FTAA.”  Id. 
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2.1.1. Modern Bolivarianism:  From Conventional Integration to 
ALBA 
The integration of Latin America and the Caribbean is not a 
novel idea.  This goal, and the ideals guiding it, traces its roots to 
Simon Bolívar’s vision for the newly freed states that had fought 
for their independence from Spanish rule in the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century.  The expression of these ideas can be found in 
his “Letter from Jamaica.”30  The desire of ALBA to integrate Latin 
America independent of colonial or neo-colonial powers is an 
attempt to make Simón Bolívar’s dream of a united confederation 
of American states a reality.31  This is a sentiment that was also 
echoed in the writings of Jose Martí.32  It is the antithesis and 
response to the Monroe Doctrine, and presents an age-old 
confrontation between the people of Latin American and 
imperialism.33  Bolívar’s vision was abandoned in the South, but 
was cemented in the North, and led to the strengthening and rise 
of the union of states that became the United States.34  ALBA, then, 
is meant to ally like-minded states committed to promoting their 
sense of the Bolivarian ideals. 
Modern regional integration in Latin America is commonly 
traced to the period immediately after World War II and the work 
 
30 Simón Bolívar, Carta de Jamaica [Letter to Jamaica] (Sept. 6, 1815), available 
at http://www.analitica.com/bitblioteca/bolivar/jamaica.asp. 
31 Fernando Ramón Bossi, Sec’y of Org. of the Bolivarian Cong. of the People, 
Address at the Fourth Summit of the Americas in Mar de Plata, Diez Puntos para 
Conocer el ALBA: Construyendo el ALBA desde los pueblos [Ten Points to Know 
of ALBA: Constructing ALBA from the People] (Nov. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa     
=showpage&pid=1980 [hereinafter Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA]. 
32 Jose Martí, Nuestra América [Our America] (Jan. 10, 1897), reprinted in ALBA, 
Jose Marti la Revista Ilustrada de Nueva York, 10 de enero de 1891, http://www 
.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=9 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
33 “ALBA responds to an old and permanent confrontation between the Latin 
American and Caribbean peoples and imperialism.  Perhaps a better way of 
presenting the conflicting projects is by contrasting Monroeism and 
Bolivarianism, perhaps this is the best way to put the conflicting projects.”  Bossi, 
supra note 31. 
34 Rafael Correa Flores, Parlamento Latinoamericano [Latin American 
Parliament], Construyendo el ALBA: “Nuestro Norte es el Sur” [Building ALBA: “Our 
North is the South], at 7 (2005), available at http://www.alternativabolivariana.org 
/pdf/libroalba.pdf. 
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of the United Nations Commission for Latin America.35  By 1960, 
the work of integration produced the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (“LAFTA”), which had as its objective the elimination 
of duties between states.36  Other efforts followed.  The Latin 
American Parliament (“Parlatino”), created in 1964, acknowledged 
from its inception the need for regional integration as 
indispensable for ensuring the freedom and development of Latin 
American nations.37  This desire for integration was again 
manifested in 1987, when a new international treaty was signed by 
eighteen Latin American nations committed to achieving the goals 
laid out in the original Parlatino founding document.38  Its object 
was the eventual Community of Latin American Nations 
(“CLAN”).39  The Parlatino has been restructured in its functions 
and political application, with the hopes of having it play a central 
role in aiding the creation of a strategy for regional integration.40 
With regional integration on the agendas of most Latin 
American states for much of their modern history, it is no surprise 
that a number of supranational institutions have been created to 
attempt to effect integration of one kind or another.  But all of them 
 
35 See U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM., THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF 
LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS, U.N. Sales No. 1950.II.G.2 (1950) 
(discussing the relevant integration of Latin America). 
36 Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American 
Free Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, 1484 U.N.T.S. 25392 [hereinafter 
Montevideo Treaty]. 
37 El Parlamento Latinoamericano y la Comunidad Latinoamericana de 
Naciones (“CLAN”) [The Latin American Parliament and the Latin American 
Community of Nations] (1999), http://www.parlatino.org/web2/es/temas                 
-especiales/comunidad-lat-de-naciones/el-parlamento-latinoamericano-y-clan 
.html. 
38 Parlamento Latinoamericano, Tratado de Institucionalización del 
Parlamento Latinoamericano [Latin American Parliament, The Treaty of 
Institutionalization of The Latin American Parliament], Nov. 16, 1987, available at 
http://www.parlatino.org/web2/documentos/doc/88.html.  Member nations 
include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, the 
Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.  Id. 
39 El Parlamento Latinoamericano y la Comunidad Latinoamericana de 
Naciones [The Latin American Parliament and the Latin American Community of 
Nations], supra note 37. 
40 La Comunidad Latinoamericana de Naciones [The Latin American 
Community of Nations] (1978), http://www.parlatino.org/web2/es/temas                
-especiales/comunidad-lat-de-naciones/la-comunidad-latinoamericana-de-
naciones.html. 
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are iterations of the standard model of regional trade association.41  
There are various Latin American and Caribbean organizations 
that have sought to promote the solidarity and unity that ALBA 
wishes to achieve.  ALBA, in this manner, can be seen as another 
mechanism through which the attempts can be solidified into an 
action plan actively taking steps to make the aspiration of 
unification a reality. 
As noted, the idea of a unified Latin America is not novel.  Nor 
is the institution of integration in Latin America linear.  It is a thick 
process in which many smaller efforts at partial integration are 
considered parts of what will eventually produce an integrated 
economic area within Latin America.  Complexity and multiplicity 
of arrangements and institutions, then, are the order of the day.  
But that complexity and thickness is also marked by a profound 
sameness.  What distinguishes most partial integration efforts are 
the details—ALBA attempts to add a very different flavor to the 
patchwork of arrangements that in the aggregate will define Latin 
American integration. 
Part of the opposition to the traditional trade and investment 
agreements, like what would become the FTAA proposal of the 
1990s, was grounded in a well developed worldview that sought to 
synthesize strong elements of Soviet style Marxist-Leninist theory, 
post-colonial theories, especially those coming out of African 
liberation movements, nineteenth century ethnonationalism, and 
twentieth century socialist internationalism.  Basic to these ideas 
was the positing of the great oppositional forces of the state as a 
representative of popular will, and transnational corporations, as 
representatives of private uncontrolled economic power inimical to 
the interests individuals, states and society.42  To the promoters of 
ALBA, the neoliberal view of granting access to markets through 
the elimination of tariffs or regulation of commerce and foreign 
investment has predominantly served the interests of large and 
 
41 For a discussion of the standard model of regional trade association, see, 
e.g., JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC 
SYSTEM 1–17 (Instit. for Int’l Econ. 1997); KERRY A. CHASE, TRADING BLOCS: STATES, 
FIRMS, & REGIONS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2005) (suggesting that private 
enterprises will seek to encourage trading blocs to maximize their economic 
interests, from gaining economies of scale to moving stages of production abroad, 
and consequently regional trading arrangements tend to promote liberalization 
rather than either state intervention or protectionism). 
42 ALBA, What is ALBA?, supra note 1. 
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developed nations.43  Numerous scientific studies can attest to the 
fact that the application of current globalization practices, such as 
the FTAA, have not and will not produce a desired level of 
development that can guarantee a greater quality of life and living 
for the people of developing nations.44 
Agreements like the FTAA would be beneficial to both sides if 
they brought similar bargaining power to the negotiations.  
However, when the bargaining power is one-sided, as in the case 
of the FTAA, the negotiations fail to consider the disparity and in 
some instances even impose a double standard.  This is particularly 
true when it comes to state assistance in the area of agriculture.45  
In addition to trying to correct the disparities and unfair practices, 
the governing principles of ALBA place the focus of fighting 
poverty and social exclusion above those of expanded free trade 
and commerce.46  This is an important step in the greater goal 
ALBA has of integrating and uniting the people and nations of 
Latin America.47  To achieve this goal, the root causes preventing 
this integration must be addressed.  They include:  (a) poverty that 
affects a majority of the population; (b) huge inequalities and 
asymmetries that exist between the countries; (c) unequal exchange 
and conditions that exist in international relations; (d) the burden 
of an unpayable debt; and (e) the imposition of structural 
adjustment policies by the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 
and World Bank (“WB”), or the rigid rules imposed by the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), which erode the social and political 
bases of support.48 
The burden of an unpayable debt and the imposition of 
structural policies upon sovereign states as a contributing factor to 
the poverty that affects Latin America and third world countries, in 
general, are not novel.  Fidel Castro also publicly denounced these 
same concepts during his address to the United Nations General 
 
43 ALBA, What is ALBA?, supra note 1, at 6 (“Free trade understood in these 
terms only benefits countries that are highly industrialized and developed.”). 
44 Id. (“In fact, scientific studies irrefutably demonstrate that the application 
of the current standards of globalization and its hemispheric or regional 
expressions have ruined the aspirations of a true endogenous development in any 
of the countries on the continent.”) 
45 Id. at 9–11. 
46 Id. at 20–21. 
47 Id. at 21 (concerning ALBA’s goals). 
48 Id. 
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Assembly in 1979.49  In the speech, Castro laid out critical points 
that now form central guiding principles in the formation of 
ALBA.  As a precursor to ALBA, Castro cited a need to change the 
current system of international relations, which he labeled as being 
plagued with inequality, injustice and oppression.50  In addition, 
Castro called for mutual respect for the sovereignty of nations, as 
well as their right to end any form of foreign occupation and their 
right to decide what their social, political and economic orientation 
should be.51  In Castro’s view, peaceful coexistence can only be 
achieved if this principle of respect for the rights of others is 
respected.52 
Furthermore, only by eliminating the constant threat posed by 
international financial institutions through economic or financial 
impositions, or the controlling of their natural resources by foreign 
companies, will the people truly be able to call themselves 
independent, sovereign, and free.53  The concepts that Castro made 
reference to, with regard to the meddling of foreign powers in the 
domestic affairs of third world countries in general, and Latin 
American nations in particular, have found a new impetus within 
the ideological foundations of ALBA. 
Castro reiterated similar concerns about the strangling effects 
the foreign debt has on small, impoverished countries in his 
address to the Fourth Congress of the Latin American Journalists’ 
Federation.54  Castro called for all third-world countries to stand 
 
49 Fidel Castro Ruz, President, Council of State, Republic of Cuba, Discurso 
pronunciado ante la XXXIV Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas [Address 
given before the 34th U.N. General Assembly] (Oct. 12, 1979) (transcript available 
at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1979/esp/f121079e.html). 
50 Id. (“We aspire to a new world order, based on justice, equality, and peace, 
which would substitute the unjust and unequal system that prevails today.”). 
51 Id. (“These principles of peaceful coexistence also include the right of 
people under foreign and colonial domination to self-determination, 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the states, the right of every 
country to end foreign occupation, the acquisition of territory by force and to 
choose their own social, political, and economic system.”). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (“Because the independence, the sovereignty, and the liberty of our 
people, apparently free, are continually threatened by the external control of their 
natural resources through the financial imposition of official international 
organizations and because of the precarious situation of their economies, which 
undermines their sovereign plentitude.”). 
54  Fidel Castro Ruz, President, Council of State, Republic of Cuba, Discurso 
pronunciado en el IV Congreso de la FELAP [Address Given During the Fourth 
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united in calling for an end to the continued demand that the debt 
be repaid, and for a reordering of the international economic world 
order to counter what he deems a world filled with avarice, 
egoism, and insatiable desires.55  Castro went on to call for the 
economic integration of Latin American countries as a necessary 
step for the development of the region, citing that even England, 
the birthplace of industrialization, found it necessary to become 
part of the European Common Market in order to continue its 
development.56 
Castro, as a precursor to ALBA, believes that Latin American 
unity can only occur through the education and participation of the 
masses in the process.57  Castro also attempts to draw parallels 
between the economic struggles of Latin America and the need to 
create a more peaceful new world order.58  He emphasizes how the 
interest generated from the loans of third-world countries, money 
that could be used to feed, medicate or shelter their people, is 
instead paid to, and used by, developed nations to invest in 
weapons and military build-ups.59  Furthermore, the unequal 
international economic order continues to add to the debt total 
and, rather than do something to curtail it, international finance 
organizations and private banks increase their interest rates while 
decreasing the loan payment periods.60  These actions result in a 
coercive system that allows these organizations to continue 
obtaining economic and political advantages at the expense of 
Latin American nations.61 
 
Congress of the Latin American Journalists’ Federation] (July 7, 1985) (transcript 
available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1985/esp/f070785e.html). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Cuba and President of the State Council and the Ministers, Discurso 
pronunciado a Delegados a la Conferencia Sindical de Los Trabajadores de 
América Latina y el Caribe sobre la Deuda Externa [Address Given During the 
Latin American and Caribbean Syndicated Workers’ Conference on External 
Debt] (July 18, 1985), http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1985/esp/ 
f180785e.html. 
61 Id. 
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2.1.2. From Internationalism to ALBA 
The idea for ALBA first appeared in 2001 proposals advanced 
by Hugo Chavez in response to the FTAA.62  It was developed in a 
series of speeches and dialogues among Cuba and Venezuela.63  
The idea was to reconstruct and reapply the ideals represented by 
Bolivar, as understood by the leaders of Cuba and Venezuela.64  
The original signatory nations, Cuba and Venezuela, also 
symbolically represent the home nations of José Martí and Simon 
Bolivar, respectively.65  The ideas and calls for unity in achieving 
reformation advanced by Castro were given new impetus after the 
election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.  During an address given in 
Venezuela to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Cuban 
Revolution, Castro again mentioned the need for Latin Americans 
to work together to achieve cooperation, integration, and unity in 
order to survive in a world where regional and sub-regional blocs 
 
62 ALBA, VI Cumbre del ALBA, Conceptualizacion de proyecto y empresa 
grannacional en el marco del ALBA [Sixth ALBA Summit, Project Conceptualization and 
National Business Within the ALBA Framework], Jan. 24–26, 2008, http://www 
.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2668#5 
63 Id. 
64  Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31; ALBA, Acuerdo entre el 
presidente de la República  Bolivarina de Venezuela y el presidente del consejo de estado de 
Cuba para la aplicacion de la Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas [Agreement 
between the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the President of the 
State Council of Cuba for the Application of Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas], 
Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News 
&file=article&sid=81 [hereinafter ALBA, Agreement for the Application of Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas]. 
65 Isagleidy Quintero, José Martí en La Revolución Bolivariana, APORREA.ORG, 
Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.aporrea.org/ideologia/a49521.html (discussing Martí’s 
connection with both Venezuela and Cuba).  This connection was used to 
symbolize the nature of the union contemplated between the two states, and has 
been generally invoked against efforts of the United States to push the FTAA. 
In 2005, Chávez began to talk about the “death” of the FTAA and about 
his plans to go the Mar del Plata summit to “bury” the FTAA.  At the 
Third Summit of the Peoples, held concurrently in Mar del Plata with the 
fourth presidential Summit of the Americas, Chávez told those in 
attendance, “With banners held high in honor of Martí, San Martín, and 
Bolívar [the principal heroes of the Cuban, Argentine, and Venezuelan 
independence movements, respectively] we are going to bury capitalism 
in order to give birth to twenty-first-century socialism.” 
Charles H. Blake, The Dynamics of Economic Integration in Venezuela and Their 
Implications for the FTAA Process, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 81, 82 (2009). 
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have become the norm.66  Castro also points to the disastrous 
consequences that have resulted when the neo-liberal policies of 
the IMF are applied to any country, calling their help a “kiss from 
the devil.”67  For Castro, it is not globalization per se that is the 
problem, but rather the ideology that is the current driving force 
behind it.68  Under the current system, countries with varying 
degrees of development and needs are all treated with the same 
fix-all formulas that serve to benefit the wealthy and powerful, 
such as the IMF and WTO.69 
Thus, according to Castro, the need for Latin America to join 
forces in creating a regional entity, with a shared culture and 
language, is indispensable in order to prevent their division 
through mechanisms such as the FTAA.70  Latin American nations 
need to unite in order to have enough strength to prevent the loss 
of their independence and annexation by the United States.71  
Citing statistics provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela, Castro 
used examples to demonstrate how the economic output and 
outlook of Venezuela continued to decline despite being the nation 
with the most natural resources in America.72  However, Castro 
sees a resurgence of hope and opportunity, not only in Venezuela, 
but in Latin Americans and other people around the world, that 
the world will move forward towards a globalization for all; there 
are no alternatives and no way around it.73  What was to become 
ALBA emerged from the notion that something different was 
needed from the trade associations and trade structuring that had 
been created before, both as an oppositional force to market based 
globalization and as a site for aggregating state opposition to the 
United States.  ALBA, in this sense, was to serve as a concrete step 
toward the elaboration of a public markets and public economics 
 
66 Fidel Castro Ruz, President, Council of State, Republic of Cuba, Una 
Revolución solo puede ser hija de la cultura y law ideas, Discurso pronunciado 
por el Presidente del Consejo de Estado de la República de Cuba [A revolution 
can only be the child of culture and ideas], Address at the Central University of 
Venezuela (Feb. 3, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno 
/discursos/1999/esp/f030299e.html) 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
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regime. It was to elaborate a socialist vision of globalization as a 
successor to the now no longer fashionable socialist 
internationalism of the first half of the twentieth century.74 
The first concrete steps taken to create ALBA as an instrument 
to achieve the dreams of Bolivar and Marti, as interpreted and 
refashioned by Caribbean leaders in the late twentieth century, 
occurred after Hugo Chavez’s success in the 2004 Venezuelan 
referendum.75  After initial meetings ALBA emerged from a 
bilateral agreement between Cuba and Venezuela.76  This 
agreement was to structure the relation between the two states on 
principles of solidarity and the exchange of goods and services, at 
the state to state level, in a manner mutually beneficial to the 
parties.77  This produced a formal agreement that was executed at a 
ceremony held on December 14, 2004 in Havana, Cuba.78  The 
original agreement called for solidarity among the nations as well 
as for the exchange of goods and services in a manner that 
maximizes the economic and social benefits to each nation.79  The 
agreement also called on the parties to develop a strategic plan 
under which the most beneficial and complimentary production 
base can be established taking into account existing industrial 
advantages, the preservation of resources, increase in the number 
of employment positions, and access to markets.80  The document 
committed the parties to make a concerted effort to eliminate 
illiteracy in third world nations,81 make investments that are 
 
74 This was made clear in speeches by Fidel Castro in the late 1990s.  See, e.g.,  
Fidel Castro Ruz, Speech given by Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee and President of 
the Council of State and Council of Ministers, in the closing ceremony of the first 
International Congress on Culture and Development (June 11, 1999), available at 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1999/ing/f110699i.html.  See generally, 
Larry Catá Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and the IMF, 
24 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 497 (2006); Fidel Castro Ruz, supra note 66. 
75 ALBA, Agreement for the Application of Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, 
supra note 64. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. (“From this date, our cooperation will be based not only on principles of 
solidarity, that will always be present, but also, to the greatest extent possible, on 
the exchange of goods and services that provide the most benefits for the 
economic and social needs of both countries”). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. art. 2. 
80 Id. art. 3. 
81 Id. art. 5. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/2
2010] FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 699 
 
mutually beneficial,82 and establish a reciprocal credit system.83  
The parties also commit to establish joint cultural exchanges that 
take into account the respective differences between the people of 
each nation.84  Of note are articles 11 and 12, in which 
consideration is given to the asymmetrical social, economic, 
juridical and political positions of each nation and how, given 
these asymmetries, steps were to be taken to ensure that 
integration and mutual cooperation can indeed be achieved.85 
Cuba—for its part—agreed: to eliminate all tariffs with respect 
to Venezuelan goods, to not tax any investments made by the 
Venezuelan government within Cuba, to grant all Venezuelan 
marine and air vessels the same treatment as if they were Cuban 
vessels, to offer 2,000 scholarships for Venezuelan students to 
study science-related careers in Cuba, to offer the services of over 
15,000 medical professionals to carry out health-related missions 
within Venezuela, and to initiate an educational exchange 
program.86  Venezuela—for its part—agreed: to exchange 
technological information in the area of energy production, to offer 
as many scholarships as are needed to Cuban students in the area 
of energy production, not to tax any investments made by the 
Cuban government within Venezuela, to help finance 
infrastructure projects within Cuba, to grant all Cuban marine and 
air vessels the same treatment as if they were Venezuelan vessels, 
and to put all Venezuelan vessels and infrastructure equipment at 
the service of Cuba to assist in the social and economic 
development of Cuba.87 
Negotiations for the construction of ALBA continued on April 
27–28, 200588 and involved the governments of Venezuela and 
Cuba.89  These have been followed by a large number of 
agreements, declarations, and actions meant to develop the 
 
82 Id. art. 6. 
83 Id. art. 7. 
84 Id. art. 10. 
85 Id. arts. 11–12. 
86 Id. art. 12. 
87 Id. art. 13. 
88 ALBA, Final Declaration of the First Meeting Between Cuba and Venezuela for 
the Application of the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas, Apr. 28, 2005, 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=show
page&pid=231. 
89 Id. 
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conceptual framework of ALBA and to construct a number of 
projects that are supposed to apply those principles in specific 
sectors and among a variety of shifting groups of ALBA members.  
And the organization has grown.  Since its inception in December 
of 2004, ALBA has increased its membership to include Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominica, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines.90  
The addition of these members changed the agreement in a 
number of ways but did not affect the fundamental character of the 
association. 
2.2. Conceptual and Institutional Basis: Structure and Ideology of 
ALBA 
At the heart of ALBA is its ideology.  ALBA’s framework most 
distinguishes it from other efforts at integration.  Indeed, ideology 
is the critical first product of this form of integration.  Integration 
requires harmonization of an ideological base for action.  Recently, 
Raul Castro made this clear when he noted: 
The countries that belong to ALBA have the privilege of 
having a modest integration scheme, constructed on the 
basis and principles of equality, whose nature denies the 
practices that created this crisis.  Our nations do not have 
the capacity, by themselves, to structurally transform the 
international economic order, but they do have the power 
to create new foundations and construct their own 
economic relations.91 
This Section starts with a consideration of that ideology in 
order to extract its underlying substance.  It then considers the 
bases on which it has sought to distinguish itself ideologically from 
the growth models that gave rise to the United States and 
European Union, for example.  The section concludes by 
examining the way that ideological distinctions are realized in 
organizational differences from standard free trade arrangements. 
 
90 See ALBA, Contribution and Subscription of the Republic of Bolivia, supra note 
5; ALBA, Adherence of Dominica, supra note 6; St. Vincent to Join ALBA, supra note 7. 
91 Raúl Castro Ruz, President of the State Council, Republic of Cuba, Speech 
in the Public Segment of the Fifth Summit of ALBA in Cumaná, Venezuela: Cuba 
ratifies the Solidarity Vocation of the People of America (Apr. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=show
page&pid=1978. 
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2.2.1. The Ideology of ALBA 
ALBA is built on the idea of the inherent potential for Latin 
America’s development independent of the United States and 
Europe, a development that has thus far failed to materialize.92  
Latin America is a region rich in natural resources, biodiversity, 
land and culture, and a history that predates the European 
invasion and conquest.93  Although prior attempts at unity have 
been unsuccessful, globalization presents a new opportunity for 
Latin America to join forces in dealing with the challenges and 
demands associated with this phenomenon.94  The power and 
advantages of integration—and the resulting economies of scale—
which are best observed in the creation and unification of the 
United States, serve as an example of how economic prosperity is 
best achieved.95  Therefore, in the eyes of the founders and 
members, it has become a necessity to develop integrated regional 
trade blocs in order to be better positioned to deal with 
transnational powers that would otherwise swallow small and 
isolated countries.96 
The development of ALBA, however, is and shall be different 
from that of the United States, because the founding members do 
not seek to follow the same path of warfare, genocide and pillaging 
that the United States undertook in achieving unity.97  The 
founders of ALBA also do not wish to follow the European Union 
 
92 Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (praising the potential of 
the region) (third point). 
93 Id. 
94 Correa Flores, supra note 34, at 7 (“The actual dilemma: how to cope with 
Globalization, perhaps a process more complex . . . but equally vital to the future 
of the Latin American People.”). 
95 Id. at 7–8 (“We observed the obvious advantages of integration in the 
development of the United States. . . . This indicates to us that the economies of 
scale and critical mass of an integrated entity like the North American colonies, 
are determining factors of economic progress.”). 
96 Id. at 8 (“Integration in regional blocks, emerges as an appropriate 
response to indiscriminate globalization.  She can sufficiently unite an economic 
and political entity to face the transnational forces that can overwhelm any of our 
countries when they remain isolated.”). 
97 See Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (“The example set by 
the European Union is not valid for us.  The way in which the United States 
achieved its independence cannot help us either in our struggle.  The latter only 
became united at the expense of extensive looting, invasions and genocide against 
the indigenous population.  The European Union in turn, is united defensively, 
under the dictates of capitalism and only exists in order to compete against the 
United States and Japan.”) (second point). 
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(“EU”) model, because, in the eyes of ALBA, the unity of the EU 
was built under capitalistic parameters of amassing strength, and 
as a defense mechanism to counter and compete with the strong 
economies of the United States and Japan.98  ALBA instead hopes 
to build an integration model that is unique and responsive to the 
needs, hopes, and aspirations of Latin American countries and 
their people.99 
ALBA is grounded on an opposition to capitalism as an 
economic and political ideology.100  ALBA member states have 
taken the position that “[c]apitalism is exhausting mankind and the 
planet.  The crisis we are experiencing is a global, systemic and 
structural crisis that cannot be considered just one more cyclic 
crisis.  Those who believe that a fiscal injection and regulatory 
measures alone will resolve the crisis are mistaken.”101  ALBA 
member states also believe that “[c]apitalism has caused an 
ecological crisis, by subordinating the conditions necessary to 
support life in the planet to the demands of markets and 
profitability.”102 
Consequently, ALBA bases its actions on four anti-capitalistic 
values: complementary action (based on the strengths that each 
country may possess), mutual cooperation, solidarity, and respect 
for the national sovereignty of each country.103  These actions stand 
in stark opposition to the “transnational, imperialist, and capitalist 
strategy” that, under the guise of the market, aims to impose the 
rights of capital above the social, political, cultural and human 
rights that states have achieved for their citizens through centuries 
of struggle.104  Hence the participation and incorporation of the 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  (“This is why [South Americans] will have to invent a new model . . . 
that covers our peoples’ needs and represents their interests.”). 
100 See ALBA, Fifth Extraordinary Summit of the ALBA Final Declaration, 
Cumaná, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php 
?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1982. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (fourth point). 
104 Judith Valencia, El ALBA dibuja un amplio trecho por andar [ALBA Illustrates 
a Wide Path to Walk], QUESTIONS, July 8, 2005, available at  http://alainet.org/active 
/8532&lang=es.  (“From cry to cry a body was massing in conflict with the 
counter-revolutionary strategy of imperial transnational capitalism.  A military 
strategy that seeks to impose itself; concealing itself behind the mercantile norms 
and disciplines, super-imposing the rights of capital over human rights: cultural, 
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masses in building the framework for integration is vital to the 
success of ALBA.105  However, the task is enormous because Latin 
American unity is not deemed enough; the process of creating a 
new non-capitalist world-order, in which people and nations can 
peacefully co-exist with one another, nature and the environment, 
must also be something the people struggle to achieve.106 
ALBA’s first step in achieving the new process of integration 
embodied in its ideals is to break the capitalist logic of lucrative 
gains, competition and of viewing the economy as chrematistic.107  
Other steps have taken form through massive programs in literacy, 
education, health care (such as vaccination campaigns), labor 
unions, workshops, and other measures that educate and mobilize 
the masses into becoming informed participants in the democratic 
process.108  In this context, ALBA then becomes a political tool as 
well.109  If ALBA is successfully carried to fruition, it would 
embody a reaction to the FTAA,110 and simultaneously serve the 
function of preventing the divide et impera of Latin American 
nations that has traditionally been achieved with the use of 
bilateral free trade agreements.111 
Opposition to the FTAA was a primary reason for attempting 
to create the alternative system of commercial trade embodied in 
the ALBA agreements.112  However, the movement has 
transformed into a rallying flag and hope for a common and 
prosperous future for Latin America that is possible through the 
betterment of the social, political, economic, environmental, and 
 
social, political of states achieved in the course of humanity’s centuries-long 
battles.”). 
105 Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (“The ALBA is a 
popular construction.”) (fifth point). 
106 Id. (“This unity of our America will not be sufficient unless we achieve a 
new world order, non-capitalist, that achieves a harmony between nations, a 
peaceful coexistence between human beings and a new relation with the 
environment and nature.”) (sixth point). 
107 Id. (“The first thing that needs to be done in the new proposal of 
integration is to break the capitalist logic, the logic of profit and gains, the logic of 
competition, the logic of the economy as chrematistic.”) (seventh point). 
108 See id. (updating the original vision of ALBA). 
109 See id. (“ALBA should be a political tool for liberation.”) (eight point). 
110 Correa Flores, supra note 34, at 4. 
111 See id. at 13. 
112 See id. at 4 (“ALBA was initially born as a reaction to the FTAA, and thus, 
as a commercial alternative.”). 
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cultural areas of the region.113  ALBA thus marks a strategic shift in 
the actions of Latin American and Caribbean people because it 
encompasses a proposal created by these nations while 
simultaneously serving as a protest against the imposing of 
agreements by external powers.  It is an offensive act, rather than a 
defensive response, that rests on three major pillars of action:114  
education to inform others about the necessity of ALBA, 
expanding the distribution of informational material among the 
masses about the benefits of ALBA, and mobilizing and organizing 
concrete steps that will foster the integration of Latin American 
people.115 
As noted in the founding document of ALBA, both Castro and 
Chavez were motivated by the Peruvian triumphs in Ayacucho116 
and the address given by Simón Bolívar to the Panamanian 
Anfictionic Congress in 1824,117 calling for the creation of a 
Hispano-American country under which all Latin American 
nations would unite.118  This goal was reiterated over a hundred 
years later by Augusto Cesar Sandino, a Nicaraguan national, who 
again called for a united Latin America in his plan to realize 
Bolívar’s ultimate dream and used it as a rallying cry in leading the 
 
113 See id.  (“ALBA . . . has transformed itself into a Latin American flag, a flag 
of hope that evokes emotion about a possible future and the pride of participating 
in its construction.”). 
114 See Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (“We must go from 
the protest stage . . . to the stage of proposals.  Resistance is necessary, but it is 
time to take action.”) (ninth point). 
115 See id. (discussing the future of ALBA). 
116 See Battle of Ayacucho, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica 
.com/EBchecked/topic/46399/Battle-of-Ayacucho (last visited Feb. 3, 2010) 
(discussing a revolutionary victory in the Latin American wars for independence).  
The victory freed Peru and ensured the independence of the nascent South 
American republics from Spain.  The revolutionary forces, among them 
Venezuelans, Colombians, Argentines, and Chileans, as well as Peruvians were 
under the leadership of Simón Bolívar’s outstanding lieutenant, the 
Venezuelan Antonio José de Sucre.  The victory is credited as ensuring the 
subsequent independence of other Latin American nations from Spanish rule.  Id. 
117 See Simón Bolívar, Speech in Lima, Invitación a los Gobiernos de 
Colombia, México, Río de la Plata, Chile y Guatemala, a formar el congreso de 
Panamá [Invitation to the Governments of Colombia, Mexio, the “River of Silver,” 
Chile and Guatemala to form the Congress of Panama] (Dec. 7, 1824), available at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=show
page&pid=7. 
118 See ALBA, Agreement for the Application of the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas, supra note 64 (presenting an agreement between the president of 
Venezuela and the State Council of Cuba). 
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movement to end the U.S. Marine occupation of Nicaragua.119  His 
writings served as a basis for the establishment of ALBA.120  
Concrete steps which might achieve these ambitions were created 
in the agreement reached between Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia 
on how to implement ALBA and the Treaty of Commerce of the 
People between these nations.121 
2.2.2. Ideological Praxis 
The general conceptual basis of ALBA outlined above is more 
specifically elaborated in the development of:  (1) the four anti-
capitalist values of ALBA, (2) the three pillars of ALBA, and (3) the 
goals of ALBA.  ALBA articulates four so-called anti-capitalist 
values around which ALBA interventions are built.  These include: 
(1) complementary action based on the strengths that each country 
may possess, (2) mutual cooperation, (3) solidarity among the 
member nations, and (4) respect for the national sovereignty of 
each country.122  It is not clear whether these are anti-capitalist or 
anti-colonialist values, and, more particularly, whether the 
solidarity and action suggested is meant to be reactive—that is, 
deployed against the policies and interests of the United States.  
Thus, for example, it has become understood that the “ethos of the 
trade system has gradually shifted from a relatively pure focus on 
the elimination of protectionism and barriers to trade among the 
World War II victors to encompass the global lifting of standards 
of living.”123  Indeed, except for the oppositional stance within 
 
119 See Augusto Cesar Sandino, Plan de realizacion del supremo sueño de 
Bolívar [Plan to realize the ultimate dream of Bolívar] (Mar. 20, 1929), available at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa 
=showpage&pid=10&page=1 (presenting the “plan of accomplishment of the 
supreme dream of Bolívar”). 
120 See Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (presenting ALBA 
as a response to conflicts between Monroism and Bolivarism) (first point). 
121 See ALBA, Acuerdo para la aplicacion de la Alternativa Bolivariana para 
los pueblos de nuestra America y el tratado de comercio de los pueblos 
[Agreement for the application of the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our 
America and the Treaty of Commerce of the People] (Apr. 28–29, 2006), available at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=show
page&pid=516 (addressing Boliva and Cuba’s agreement to join ALBA). 
122 See Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (describing how 
anti-capitalist values form the support for ALBA) (fourth point). 
123 See DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER: 
THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE 204–05 (2008).  This change applies 
not only to bilateral engagement but also to the construction of the global trading 
system itself.  Patterson and Afilalo note that “in the footsteps of the European 
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which ALBA is situated, it would be difficult to suggest that these 
values are not amenable to capitalist systems. 
The difference comes from the application of these values—
targeting not markets and private activities, but mass social 
movement programs and state action.  These are articulated 
through the development of a theory of stages of development to 
which ALBA states are committed:  (1) education to inform others 
about the necessity for an ALBA, (2) expanding the distribution of 
informational material among the masses about the benefits of 
ALBA, and (3) to mobilize and organize concrete steps that will 
foster the integration of Latin American people.124  These were 
elaborated through the announcement of twelve goals to be 
achieved in the service of ALBA values and to foster progress 
through the stages of ALBA socio-political development.125  The 
goals are both programmatic and ideological.  They are grounded 
both in the value of political expression and in the construction of a 
framework for implementation of specific activities to be 
undertaken by ALBA member states.  It is not clear, though, that 
 
commitment to a social and not merely economic union, Doha recognized the 
need for all people ‘to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains 
that the multilateral trading system generates.’”  Id. (quoting World Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, para. 2, 
WT/MIN(01).DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002)). 
124 See Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31 (“Resistance is 
necessary, but it is time to take action.”) (ninth point). 
125 In 2003, during an intervention at an ALADI Conference, Hugo Chavez 
announced twelve goals that ALBA would subscribe to and work diligently to 
achieve.  The goals are as follows: (i) promote the fight against poverty, (ii) 
preserve the identity and autonomy of Latin America, (iii) provide for the transfer 
of technology and technical assistance, (iv) develop the human resources of the 
people, (v) prevent any agreement from becoming an obstacle to the sharing of 
scientific and technological advances, (vi) stop the abuse created by monopolies or 
oligopolies through the creation of efficient mechanisms that guarantee fair 
competition, (vii) prevent foreign investors from making demands to a state that 
they be given control over state monopolies of public interest, (viii) provide 
special and differential treatment to states with small economies in order to 
provide them with opportunities for growth, (ix) promote a process of wide social 
participation that can be described as democratic, (x) guarantee that the economic, 
social, cultural and civil rights be treated as interdependent, indivisible and 
cannot be renounced, (xi) ensure that commercial interests or the interests of 
investors are never given supremacy over human rights or the sovereignty of a 
state, (xii) subject the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement to adhere to the 
agreements protecting human rights, the environment and existing genres, and 
(xiii) promote the creation of Structural Convergence Funds to correct any 
asymmetries that may exist between states. 
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the goals, singly or in the aggregate, are more valuable for their 
ideological power or for their effect on the ground. 
In addition to these goals, ALBA also has four major objectives 
that seek to blend values and concerns over practical 
implementation.  The first is to promote the integration and 
development of Latin America through cooperation, solidarity, 
and unity in an effort to place the interests of the people above 
those of transnational capital.126  The second aims to promote 
integration agreements that develop the industrial and social 
infrastructures of a nation, and the region, with the goal of 
eliminating poverty, social exclusion and to assure better living 
conditions for all the inhabitants of Latin American nations.127  The 
third is to counter Neo-Liberal policies, particularly the attempt by 
the United States to create a Free Trade of the Americas, which 
traditionally benefit developed nations at the expense of other 
developing nations.128  The fourth is to use complementary action 
based on the strengths that each country may possess, mutual 
cooperation, solidarity, and respect for the national sovereignty of 
each country.129 
Together, these values, objectives, and goals present a unified 
ideological position.  This position serves as a basis for 
approaching all issues of transnational arrangements.  It privileges 
the state against private actors.  It suggests a tighter control of 
individuals and their arrangements by the state, and also suggests 
that private interests must be subordinated to the needs of the state 
(as understood by those in control of the apparatus of state 
governance).  Private markets are incidental to the development of 
large sectors of state control.  Because neither politics nor 
economics can be left to the private sector, and because the private 
sector might well serve as proxy for the interests of states where 
those private activities originate, the state-to-state arrangements 
must be the basis of any movement of people, capital, goods, or 
services.  Lastly, the ideological position combines a long tradition 
of anti-colonialism with anti-Americanism to produce an 
ideological system in which states are essential to combat the direct 
and indirect interventions of the United States (and to a lesser 
 
126 See ALBA, What is ALBA?, supra note 1. 
127 See id. 
128 Bossi, Ten Points to Know of ALBA, supra note 31. 
129 Id. 
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extent the old European colonial powers) in the development of 
adhering states.  For many states in Latin America, this is an 
intoxicating mix.  It serves to legitimate stronger state control over 
a private sector that had been relying on the development of global 
markets to liberate itself from local barriers to development.  It 
shifts the power to direct markets from the private to the public 
sector.  It provides an avenue for transferring blame to a 
demonized “other” against which state activity is directed.  It 
provides a basis for the maintenance of control through the form of 
democratic mass movements by linking state action to the 
maintenance of the masses, and by so doing, marginalizing the 
relationship between the masses and other institutional or civil 
society elements. 
Most importantly, this ideology preserves for states control 
over the nature and extent of actual arrangements with entities 
beyond its borders.  Packaged in this form, the ideology of ALBA 
has become its most critically successful product.  We next turn to 
the institutional manifestation of the ALBA ideology and its 
implementation. 
2.3. Institutionalizing and Implementing ALBA: Ideology in Action 
2.3.1. The Institutional Organization of ALBA 
ALBA is comprised of seven Commissions, each dealing with a 
separate area: Political, Social, Economic, Investment and Finance, 
Energy, Environment, and Youth.  The Commissions report to the 
Council of ALBA Ministers and Council of ALBA Social 
Movements, who in turn must report to the Council of ALBA 
Presidents.130  The Commissions are headed by the national 
Ministers of the respective areas of each of the member nations and 
together form the Council of ALBA Ministers.  The Council of 
ALBA Presidents is made up of the respective presidents of each 
ALBA member nation.131  Because ALBA seeks to respect the 
national sovereignty of member nations, by nature the interaction 
among member states takes the form of agreements that must be 
accepted by the national legislative bodies of the member 
 
130 ALBA, Organizational Structure of ALBA, Annex 1, http://www 
.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1817 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
131 Id. 
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nations.132  There are calls, however, for the creation of an ALBA 
Constitution, with supranational authority to coordinate and 
delegate ALBA policies that can better achieve the social and 
political integration of Latin American nations.133 
ALBA, then, is organized more as a space through which 
mutual cooperation on the basis of ALBA principles can be 
effected, rather than a more conventionally constituted 
international organization; it has been criticized as such.134  Yet this 
institutional organization reflects the objectives of the organization.  
The first,135 second,136 third,137 and fourth138 objectives each carry an 
institutional component that is reflected in the institutions of the 
ALBA and their relationships to the member states of the 
organization.  The result is substantially less autonomy for the 
institution at the supra-national level, and more control at the 
member state level.  The supra-national element of ALBA serves 
more as a pass-through and reflection of member state consensus 
than as the locus of an autonomous aggregate power reflecting a 
ceding of sovereignty up to the supra-national level.  It emphasizes 
the central position of the state in the construction of 
internationalist frameworks.  This state-centering integration 
project critically affects the implementation of the system, a subject 
considered next. 
 
132 Id. 
133 See Enrique Antonio Acuña Mendoza, La Constitución Bolivariana en el 
marco del ALBA: La firma de los acuerdos de la iniciativa ALBA, sustentados en 
los preceptos de la Constitución Bolivariana [The Bolivarian Constitution in the 
ALBA Framework: The Signature of Agreements of the ALBA Initiative, 
Supported in the Precepts of the Bolivarian Constitution] (Mar. 20–22, 2007) 
(discussing the Bolivarian constitution in relation to ALBA). 
134 “When ALBA was conceived, it was not a treaty organization and its 
principles resided in economic cooperation arrangements which appeared to 
benefit countries that joined it with Venezuela being the principal donor.  As 
Professor Norman Girvan argued in a May 2008 paper, ‘ALBA does not take the 
form of an international or intergovernmental organisation, treaty or integration 
scheme in the normal sense.’”  Sir Ronald Sanders, Time to Care Again for 
CARICOM, BBC NEWS, Apr. 27, 2009, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
caribbean/news/story/2009/04/printable/090424_sanders2404.shtml (the author 
is a consultant and former Caribbean diplomat). 
135 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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2.3.2. Implementation—Economic Agenda 
Conception, ideology, and organization can only take a supra-
national organization so far.  The real value of an organization 
beyond its ideological purpose is measured by its implementation.  
ALBA is a young organization.  Still, it has begun to elaborate a 
series of programs to provide a basis for understanding how the 
member states intend to translate ideology and concept to reality 
on the ground.  The principal effect of ALBA has been an increase 
in state-to-state trade, especially among the ALBA founders.139 
ALBA’s most important efforts have centered on the 
establishment of PETROCARIBE, an energy cooperation 
agreement proposed by Venezuela to Caribbean nations140 that 
aims to resolve the asymmetries that said nations have in accessing 
energy resources.141  It aims to create a new order that is more 
equitable and just.142  Its objective is to contribute to the 
transformation of Latin American and Caribbean societies into 
more just, cultured, participatory, and solid-minded societies by 
removing social inequalities and promoting an improved quality of 
life through the effective participation of the people in the 
determination of the affairs of their respective states.143  Signatory 
nations include: Cuba, Venezuela, Antigua and Barbados, 
Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, the 
Dominican Republic, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint 
Lucía, Suriname, Saint Kitts and Neves, Haití, and Nicaragua.144  
The program has produced a number of trade agreements that 
 
139 The volume of commercial trade between Venezuela and Cuba went from 
$973 million (U.S.) in 2001 to $2.4 billion (U.S.) in 2005.  Martha Lomas Morales, 
Foreign Investment and Economic Collaboration Minister for the Republic of 
Cuba, Remarks at the Signing of Agreements of the ALBA Framework between 
Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela 7 (Apr. 29, 2006). 
140 ALBA, Petrocaribe: Energía para la union [Petrocaribe: Energy for the Union], 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa 
=showpage&pid=1961 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (“Petrocaribe is an energy 
cooperation agreement proposed by the Bolivarian Government of Venezuela, in 
order to address the issues regarding asymmetrical access to energy resources, 
through a new favorable exchange plan, equitable and fair to the Caribbean 
countries, the majority of them without state control over the supply of these 
resources.”). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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represent state-to-state barter relations centered on the provision of 
Venezuelan petroleum. 
The most interesting development has been the efforts to build 
the Banco de ALBA (Bank of ALBA).145  Its founders hope that it 
will serve as the blueprint for the future financial system through 
which ALBA’s social, cooperative, and Grandnational Projects are 
to be funded.146  The primary purpose of the Bank of ALBA is to 
provide the economic and financial credit needs of ALBA member 
countries in financing and completing the thirty-two 
Grandnational Projects agreed to during the fifth ALBA Summit.147  
The Bank of ALBA, like ALBA itself, is founded on the principles 
of solidarity and mutual cooperation, and it extends those ideals 
into the banking sector.148  The host country for the Bank as well as 
the operating aspects related to its functioning are currently under 
negotiation by the four ALBA member states.  The framework for 
the Bank’s operation was discussed and approved during a 
meeting of the Bank of ALBA Commission held on July 30, 2007.  
To date the details of the arrangement have not been made public.  
In the area of finance, however, Banco del Sur (Bank of the South) 
has emerged as another project that, although not within the 
framework of ALBA, is also being promoted in an effort to create a 
wholly South American source of funding and economic 
solidarity.149  Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are 
 
145 ALBA, Acta fundacional del Banco del ALBA [Foundational Act of the 
Bank of ALBA] (Jan. 26, 2008), available at http://www.alternativabolivariana 
.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2668. 
146 ALBA, Declaracion politica de la VI Cumbre de la Alternativa Bolivariana 
para los pueblos de nuestra America  [Political Declaration of the VI Summit of 
the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America] (Jan. 24–26, 2008), 
available at http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News     
& file=article&sid=2668#5. 
147 ALBA, Grandnational Projects Agreed to During the Fifth ALBA Summit by 
Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, May 29, 2007, http://www 
.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1802 
[herinafter ALBA, Grandnational Projects]. 
148 Memorandum de Entendimiento entre la República  de Bolivia, La 
República  de Cuba, La República  de Nicaragua y La República  Bolivariana de 
Venezuela para la  Creacion del Banco del ALBA [Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Republic of Bolivia, the Republic of Cuba, the 
Republic of Nicaragua, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the creation 
of the Bank of ALBA] (June 6, 2007), available at http://www 
.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=16
06. 
149 Ricardo Angel Cardona, Banco Sur Financiará Desarrollo Integral Soberano y 
digno de Continente Americano [Bank of the South and the Sovereign Integral 
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founding members of the banking entity.150  It is also likely that 
Brazil will join.151  In addition, MERCOSUR members have agreed 
to participate in the creation of the Bank. 152  To date, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela have 
agreed to work together in establishing the framework under 
which this entity will operate.153 
In addition to serving as the financial center for ALBA, the 
members have also begun talks to create a national currency of the 
south, to be known as the “sucre.”154  The object is to aid efforts at 
integration in a way that avoids the incidental and perceived 
detrimental effects of national economies bound by connections to 
the U.S. dollar.155 
Other regional organizations, including ALADI, have taken 
this seriously.156  The Bank hopes to deliver better financing 
options for completing the Grandnational Projects by combining 
the economic forces of each nation to achieve a greater economy of 
scale that counts on a greater economic base on which to build.157 
 
Development will fund South Americas], available at http://www 
.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2402. 
150 ALBA, En breve, Banco del Sur [Bank of the South in Short], May 10, 2007, 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article 
&sid=2361. 
151 Id. 
152 Press Release, Prensa Web RNV, Mercosur Aprueba Creacion del Banco 
del Sur [Mercosur Approves the Creations of Bank of the South] (May 25, 2007), 
available at http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News 
&file=article&sid=1921#1 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
153 Id. 
154 ALBA impulsa lanzamiento del sucre como nueva moneda del sur [ALBA’s Drive 
to Launch the Sucre as the New Currency of the South], VENEZOLANA DE TELEVISION, 
Mar. 1, 2009, http://www.vtv.gov.ve/noticias-nacionales/15100. 
155 “Viceminister Arias Cárdenas explained ‘it is not easy in a strained 
economy, like those of some of our countries, to move to a common currency, a 
full integration for preservation while facing an international financial crisis; but 
contrary to what is expected we will have good news within the next few days 
about the advancement and strengthening of the Sucre (common currency) as 
well as the compensation fund.’”  Id. (translation by Author).  
156 See ALADI Talks Global Economic Crisis, ESCAMBRAY (Sancti Spiritus, Cuba), 
Apr. 29, 2009, available at http://www.escambray.cu/Eng/news 
/Waladi090429309.htm (“The global economic and financial crisis is Wednesday 
on the table at the 15th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 
Latin American Integration Association (“ALADI”). . . .  The Council of Ministers 
will analyze the characteristics and scopes of the Payment System on Local 
Currencies (“SML”) of the MERCOSUR and the Unitary System of Regional 
Compensation (“SUCRE”), that ALBA member countries plan to activate.”). 
157 See ALBA, Grandnational Projects, supra note 147. 
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Grandnational Projects are newly developed and present one of 
the most interesting features of ALBA applied ideological work.  
During the Fifth ALBA summit, the members expanded their 
programs to include “Grandnational” aspirations in the areas of 
education, culture, fair trade, finance, nutrition, health, 
telecommunications, transportation, tourism, mining, industry, 
and energy.158  The first is to focus on the production and 
distribution of certain agricultural products within ALBA.159  These 
grandnational enterprises that would work in the same manner 
that a multinational company would, except that it is run by the 
state in accordance with the goals and objectives of ALBA.160  
Grannacional (Grandnational) enterprises are structured both to 
invert traditional private enterprises as well as to ground them in a 
socialist form of corporate social responsibility regime.  Thus, for 
example, “The concept of Grandnational businesses emerges in 
opposition to the traditional transnational enterprises, thus its 
economic dynamics will set the businesses up to favor the 
production of goods and services to satisfy basic human needs 
ensuring their continuity and breaking the logic of reproducing 
and accumulating capital.”161  These enterprises can be state owned 
or mixed.162  They are transnational in the sense that they may be 
owned and operated by more than one ALBA state,163 and are 
 
158 ALBA, V Cumbre del ALBA—Proyecto Grannacional [V Summit of ALBA—
Grandnational Project], May 29, 2007, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org 
/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1802 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
159 ALBA, ALBA Impulsa lanzamiento del sucre como nueva moneda del sur [The 
Impulse to Launch the Sucre as the New Currency of the South], Mar. 3, 2009, 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article 
&sid=4077 (according to Viceminister for the Latin America and Caribbean, 
Francisco Arias Cárdenas of Venezuela, “ALBA’s proposal is to create a new 
business that permits increased productivity of soy in Bolivia, to accelerate and 
drive the nascent seed of this item in Venezuela and Nicaragua and through this 
facilitate the marketing of the company through itself”). 
160 ALBA, Conceptualización de proyecto y empresa grannacional en el marco del 
ALBA [Project Conceptualization and Grandnational Business in the ALBA Framework], 
Jan. 24–26, 2008, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name           
= News&file=article&sid=2668. 
161 ALBA, Conceptualización de proyecto y empresa grannacional en el marco del 
ALBA [Project Conceptualization and Grandnational Business in the ALBA Framework], 
at 5, Jan. 24–26, 2008, available at http://www.minci.gob.ve/doc 
/conceptualizacion_de_proyectos.pdf. 
162 Id. at 8 (“The grandnational business will be the absolute property of the 
states and will be associated with businesses in the private sector for the 
development of specific activities.”). 
163 Id. at 7. 
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meant to operate across borders, though principally in the ALBA 
zone alone.164  The corporate social responsibility of these 
enterprises are said to be essentially the same as those that drive 
ALBA itself.165  It is not clear what the model will be for their 
operation.  However, it would not be unreasonable to assume that 
the model of the enterprises currently run through the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias (“FAR”) (Revolutionary Armed Forces) 
might not provide the prototype.166 
Lastly, since the close of an Extraordinary Summit in April 
2008, ALBA has created the ALBA Network of Food Trade and the 
ALBA Food Security Fund, funded initially with $100 million.167  In 
February 2009 it was announced that “Venezuela, Nicaragua, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Honduras, and Dominica created a joint food 
production company and laid out plans to guarantee food security 
in the Caribbean, Central, and South American regions during an 
extraordinary summit of the regional trade bloc known as the 
ALBA in Caracas.”168  It is to be funded from out of the $100 
million fund created in April of 2008.169 
 
164 Id. at 8 (“Thus we have grandnational businesses that will be businesses of 
the ALBA countries that will be productively integrated, whose production will 
primarily take place in the intra-alba market (fair-trade zone), and whose 
operations will be efficiently performed.”). 
165 See id. at 6–7. 
166 On the entrepreneurial activities of the FAR, see, e.g., Frank O. Mora & 
Quintan Wiktorowicz, Economic Reform and the Military: China, Cuba, and Syria in 
Comparative Perspective, 44 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 87, 104 (2003) (describing how 
political leadership looked to the military to restructure the economy in the early 
1990s). 
167 See ALBA, Presidential Summit of Managua, Sovereignty and Food Safety: Food 
For Life, May 7, 2008, http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php 
?name=News&file=article&sid=2962 (discussing the ALBA network of food and 
trade). 
168 James Suggett, ALBA Trade Bloc Forms Joint Food Company at Summit in 
Venezuela, VENEZUELAANALYSIS.COM, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.venezuelanalysis 
.com/news/4165 (“‘We are going to create a supranational company, like a 
transnational company, but in this case with the concept of a great nation, to 
produce food with the goal of guaranteeing food sovereignty to our people,’ 
declared Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.”). 
169 See id. (“The new ALBA company will receive an initial investment of $49 
million drawn from the $100 million food security fund that ALBA member 
nations created during the height of the world food crisis last April.”). 
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2.3.3. Implementation—Social Agenda 
Despite the prominence of the ideological element, ALBA has 
managed to initiate a number of programs.  Though all are in the 
initial stages of development, they suggest the ways in which 
ALBA may be implemented.  One group of programs is focused on 
education.  Mision Robinson was a program to reduce illiteracy with 
a focus on the illiteracy of indigenous people.170  Phase II of the 
project is intended to guarantee at least a sixth grade level 
education for all.171  Another program, Mision Ribas, extends 
Robinson’s goal in its attempt to guarantee high school education 
and diploma to all those who lack this basic education.172  In 
addition, another program, Mision Sucre (Mission Sugar), sought to 
give thousands of Venezuelans access to university education with 
an emphasis on graduates in much needed specialties.173 
Implementation has also focused on programs of delivery of 
medical care.  One, Mission Barrio Adentro (Mission Inside the 
Neighborhood), brought Cuban health care workers to 
Venezuela.174  A large number of Venezuelan students were also 
admitted to Cuba to study health related professions.175  Another 
 
170 See Lomas Morales, supra note 139, at 4 (discussing Mission Robinson).  
The program, Mission Robinson, used the “Yo sí puedo” (“Yes I Can”) method.  
Id.  1,482,543 illiterates were alphabetized, of which 76,369 were native Indians, 
during phase I of the program.  See id. 
171 See id. (explaining that the second phase of Mission Robinson was 
scheduled to begin in October of 2003). 
172 See id. (describing Mission Ribas).  There are currently 601,004 students 
attending classes and 168,137 graduates from the program since its inception in 
November 2003.   
 173  Id. 
174 See id. at 3 (discussing the stages of Barrio Adentro).  Under phase I of the 
program, 23,601 Cuban health workers rendered health related services to a 
population of over 17 million Venezuelans.  Id.  Under phase II, 133 Integral 
Diagnostic Centers were built, as were 171 Integral Rehabilitation Wards and 5 
High Tech Diagnostic Centers, all distributed throughout Venezuela’s territory.  
Id.  In addition, another 300 centers are near completion.  Id.  In total, 1,235 
projects are being carried out that upon successful completion will transform 
Venezuela’s health care system into a modern and efficient system without social 
barriers to accessing the services offered.  Id. at 3–4. 
175 See id. at 4 (explaining that 6,525 Cuban specialists are working on Barrio 
Adentro).  In addition to the services and facilities that Venezuela is receiving, 
there are 3,328 Venezuelan students studying General Medicine in Cuba.  Id.  
There are also 12,940 Venezuelans in Venezuela pursuing a career in Social Health 
who are being trained by 6,525 Cuban specialists who work as part of Barrio 
Adentro.  Id.  
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program, Mission Milagro (Mission Miracle), resulted in the 
provision of medical care for Venezuela in exchange for 
Venezuelan goods for Cuba.176 
The implementation of the ideological component of ALBA is 
also well tended in a series of programs designed to reshape the 
political and economic culture of the masses.  These programs are 
tied to notions of mass social mobilizations in the service of social 
justice ideals as conceived by the directing states.  One such 
program, Mission Vuelvan Caracas (Mission Return Caracas), seeks 
to train and educate the Venezuelan people so that they may work 
alongside the government in transforming the social and economic 
landscape of the country.177  In a sense, trade cooperation at the 
supranational level is meant to transform the ideological basis of 
society at the grassroots level.  The government uses the 
supranational apparatus of the ALBA organization to effect large 
social changes that might have been impossible if undertaken as a 
domestic matter. 
But ALBA has also begun to assert its influence within the 
Caribbean in increasingly powerful ways.  It is also becoming an 
important force within regional organizations, like the 
Organization of American States.  For doubters, the influential role 
played by ALBA and its member states in the international 
reaction to the aborted constitutional coup of Honduras’ former 
President Zelaya and his removal by the legislative and executive 
branches of that country should serve as a reminder that ALBA is 
starting to be a force to be reckoned with, at least in the 
Caribbean.178  ALBA’s position and characterization of the events 
in Honduras quickly became the standard version of reality.   
 
176 Id. at 4.  As of April 2006, in Venezuela 220,571 surgical procedures had 
been performed, of which 188,389 were done to Venezuelan patients.  Id.  15,500 
patients have also been flown to Cuba to receive medical care.  Press release, 
ALBA, Destacan Desarrollo de Programas Del ALBA [Highlights of the 
Development of ALBA Programs] (Jun. 28, 2007), available at http://www 
.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2060. 
177 See Lomas Morales, supra note 139, at 4–5 (describing the Mission Vuelvan 
Caras).  Since its inception in March of 2004, 264,720 people have graduated and 
gone on to establish 7,000 cooperatives and businesses.  Id.  
178 See Reflections on the Declaration of Independence: From a Crisis of U.K. 
Constitutionalism in the Americas to a Global Constitutional Crisis in Honduras, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/reflection-on-american-
independence-in.html (Jul. 4, 2009) (describing how the declaration of 
independence can illustrate ideas surrounding Honduran revolutions). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/2
2010] FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 717 
 
The regional bloc of the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas (“ALBA”) condemned the coup in Honduras that 
ousted President Manuel Zelaya Sunday.  A statement 
issued after a special meeting of foreign ministers urged the 
reinstatement of Zelaya, and said the ALBA member 
countries will not recognize any government or person 
rising from the coup.179   
ALBA has been instrumental in staging the events in Honduras to 
great effect. 
On the basis of their joint efforts, the imperfect impeachment of 
former President Zelaya has been reconstituted as a coup and 
produced significant diplomatic victories for the revolutionary 
efforts of former President Zelaya amongst foreigners, especially in 
Europe.  Most spectacularly, perhaps, was the recent 
announcement by the European Union that it would suspend $90 
million in aid to Honduras until Honduras agrees to take Mr. 
Zelaya back.  The EU External Relations Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner issued the following statement:  “In view of the 
circumstances, I have taken the difficult decision to suspend all 
budgetary support payments.  I strongly appeal to both parties to 
refrain from any action or declaration which might further escalate 
tension, thus making the prospect of a solution more difficult.”180 
This sort of political solidarity within the ALBA member states 
suggests the strength of the political privilege of the organization. 
3. ALBA WITHIN THE WEB OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
For all of its purported uniqueness, ALBA operates in a 
regional context rich with traditional trade arrangements that are 
layered on each other.  This section seeks to contextualize the 
similarities and differences of ALBA, not on its own terms—the 
object of Part I of this essay—but in terms of the construction of 
traditional trade associations in the Western Hemisphere.  For that 
purpose, ALBA will be compared to Mercado Comun del Sur 
(Common Market of the South, or “MERCOSUR”) and the Free 
 
179 ALBA Condemns Honduran Coup, Zelaya Participates Meeting, PEOPLE’S 
DAILY ONLINE, June 29, 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777 
/90852/6688633.html. 
180 EU Suspends $90m Aid to Honduras, BBC NEWS ONLINE, July 20, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8159986.stm. 
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Trade Area of the Americas.  The comparison will show that ALBA 
is the only agreement that explicitly mentions as a goal the 
elimination of poverty and social exclusion for all the inhabitants 
of Latin America.  ALBA is also unique in its calling for solidarity 
and cooperation in order to place the interests of the people above 
those of transnational capital.  The other agreements focus the bulk 
of their attention to the establishment or augmentation of markets 
through the exchange of goods and capital.  ALBA and 
MERCOSUR do, however, make reference to the goal of attaining 
Latin American unity.  Yet ALBA remains embedded in a large 
web of trade arrangements among its member states that bind 
them in different ways under different arrangements.  That 
produces cooperation, but is a challenge.  This is most acutely felt 
in ALBA’s relationships with CARICOM. 
Lastly, the ideological framework of trade relations is not 
merely the subject of customs and trade unions; it is especially 
telling in the context of bilateral trade agreements.  These 
arrangements suggest the limits of the social justice and state-to-
state focus of ALBA within a trade environment in which even the 
most committed states engage with the private-markets-oriented 
global economic system on its own terms.  Latin American unity 
can be as easily expressed in conventional free trade and economic 
cooperation agreements targeting private markets, as they can be 
expressed in inter governmental arrangements, like ALBA.  It is 
those similarities, tensions, and connections that are explored here. 
3.1. Regional Trade Arrangements 
Regional trade agreements form the basis of much of the efforts 
toward economic integration within Latin America, and between 
the region and its neighbors in the Hemisphere.  There are a 
number of these arrangements that bind some but not all of the 
states of the region.  The only effort to effect such a unitary 
arrangement, the FTAA, has stalled.  This section examines these 
forms of trade arrangements to suggest the way in which their 
ideology and objectives are institutionalized.  The object of this 
examination is to draw out similarities and tensions with ALBA. 
There are useful examples of other state-to-state organizations 
that seek to achieve some form of Latin American or South 
American unity.  The first is the Comunidad Andina de Naciones 
(Andean Community of Nations, or “CAN”), comprised of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, which was created with the purpose 
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of obtaining a faster, more equitable and autonomous development 
among the four member nations.181  It aims to deepen the process 
of integral integration of Andean, South American, and Latin 
American nations and to contribute to equitable and sustainable 
human development that respects the diversity and asymmetries 
existent in each nation.182  This organization is implemented 
through a series of weak supranational organs whose operation is 
strictly controlled by the state organs of the member states.  To 
date, the Andean Community has served as a basis for political 
solidarity and small efforts to reduce customs and tariff barriers to 
trade.  Inter-governmentalist approaches to the facilitation of 
private economic activity, harmonization of legal regimes to the 
extent necessary to effect those more integrated markets combined 
with a suspicion of devolution of power to effect these changes in 
institutions other than the political organs of each member state 
marks the ideology and organization of this institution. 
The second is the Asociasion Latinoamericana de Integración 
(Latin American Association for Integration, or “ALADI”), created 
in 1980 through the Treaty of Montevideo, which has, as a primary 
objective, the creation of a common Latin American market.183  The 
common market is to be created through the use of preferential 
tariff treatment among member nations, as well as through the 
signing of regional and bilateral agreements.184  The scope of 
proposed agreements can include financial cooperation, 
 
181 See Comunidad Andina de Naciones, About Us, http://www 
.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (discussing 
the membership and purpose of CAN). 
182 Id.  
183 See Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration 
Association, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 [hereinafter ALADI Treaty] 
(discussing the objective of establishing a common market among member 
countries).  ALADI might be usefully understood as a successor to the Latin 
American Free Trade Association.  See Montevideo Treaty, supra note 37, art. 1 
(establishing a free trade area and institution).  LAFTA was generally regarded as 
a failure.  See RAFAEL A. PORRATA-DORIA, JR., MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET 
OF THE SOUTHERN CONE 14 (2005) (discussing how the treaty was “unworkable.”). 
184 See Asociasion Latinoamericana de Integracion, Presentacion [Latin 
American Association of Integration, Presentation], http://www.aladi.org               
/nsfaladi/perfil.nsf/vsitioweb/introduccion (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).  See also 
Servicio De Información Agropecuaria Del Ministerio De Agricultura Y Ganadería Del 
Ecuador [Agricultural Information Service of the Minstry of Agriculture and Livestock of 
Ecuador], http://www.sica.gov.ec/ingles/comercio/docs/aladi/principios.html 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2010) (breaking down tariff preference levels according to the 
economic development of each country). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
720 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
complementary economic action, exchanges of scientific and 
technological information, and preservation of the environment.185  
ALADI’s membership currently includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.186  Under ALADI, a large number of 
partial trade agreements, customs, and free trade areas have 
sprung up among widely varying groupings of ALADI members.  
“In short, ALADI seems to be primarily a framework within which 
member states can negotiate and enter into economic integration 
agreements with each other and a ‘keeper of the flame’ for the ideal 
of integration in Latin America.”187  ALADI has set the conceptual 
stage for the proliferation of a wide variety of arrangements among 
its members.  It, in a sense, made ALBA possible. 
The third is Union de Naciones del Sur (South American 
Community of Nations, or UNASUR), formed through the 
Declaration of Cusco in 2004.  It aims to promote a South America 
that approaches the political, social, economic, environmental, and 
structural sectors with an integrated approach that promotes the 
development of South America, Latin America and the Caribbean 
region in general.188  UNASUR aims to unite the Andean 
Community of Nations and the Common Market of the South as 
part of a single economic, social, and developmental trade bloc in 
accordance with ALADI.189  All twelve sovereign nations of South 
America are members of this community. 
The last, and perhaps most important, is MERCOSUR, 
discussed in greater detail in the next section.  It also has as its 
objective the creation of a common market among its member 
 
185 See Asociasion Latinoamericana de Integracion, Presentacion supra note 
183. 
186 See ALADI Treaty, supra note 183, at 672. 
187 See PORRATA-DORIA, JR., supra note 183, at 16. 
188 See Union de Naciones Suramericanas, Declaración del Cusco sobre la 
Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones, III Cumbre Presidencial Sudamericana 
[Union of South American Nations, Declaration of Cusco about the South 
American Community of Nations, III South American Presidential Summit] (Dec. 
8, 2004), http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/dec_int/cusco 
_sudamerica.htm (explaining how an integrated South America will be developed 
and refined). 
189 See South American Community of Nations, Declaration on the 
Convergence of Integration Processes in South America (Sept. 30, 2007), 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/documentos/documents/casa_2005 
_1.htm (requesting Secretariats of ALADI, CAN, MERCOSUR, and CARICOM to 
study convergence of economic agreements in South America). 
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states.190  However, it also aims to achieve economic development 
and social justice through integration in order to secure its 
members a proper place in the international economy.191  In 
addition, the founding document of MERCOSUR specifies that the 
organization should serve as a step in the greater process of 
achieving Latin American integration as envisioned in ALADI.192 
MERCOSUR was established in 1990 among Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Paraguay to promote trade among its members.193  
Through MERCOSUR, these states sought to establish a common 
market that permits more unimpeded movement of goods, 
services, and modes of production through the elimination of 
customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on goods of the member 
states.194  It was also meant to expand the domestic market of each 
member state, through integration, in order to achieve economic 
development with social justice, so as to secure the member 
countries their place in the international economy.195  Additionally, 
MERCOSUR serves as a site for the coordination of the 
macroeconomic policies of the member states in a way that 
optimizes the use and mobility of modes of production to achieve 
greater and more efficient operations.196  Lastly, it serves as a step 
in the greater process of achieving Latin American integration, as 
envisioned in the Latin American Integration Association.197 
MERCOSUR is organized like many organizations of this type, 
framed around a governing institution composed of 
representatives of all member states and a secretariat to keep 
 
190 Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, 
the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic 
of Uruguay, art. 1, Mar. 26, 1991, 2140 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Asunción]. 
191 See id. pmbl. (explaining in the Preamble that economic development is 
necessary for social justice and economic development). 
192 See id.  
193 For a history of MERCOSUR, see generally PORRATA-DORIA, JR., supra note 
183, at 7–21. 
194 See Treaty of Asunción, supra note 190, art. 1 (discussing the purpose and 
details of the common market). 
195 See Treaty of Asunción, supra note 190, pmbl. (“[The parties are] 
[c]onvinced of the need to promote the scientific and technological development 
of the States Parties and to modernize their economies in order to expand the 
supply and improve the quality of available goods and services, with a view to 
enhancing the living conditions of their populations”). 
196 Id. art 1. 
197 See id. art. 8 (referencing prior commitments made under ALADI). 
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operations running.  In the case of MERCOSUR, the following 
inter-governmental organs have decision-making power: the 
Council of the Common Market, the Common Market Group and 
the MERCOSUR Trade Commission.198  The Council of the 
Common Market is the highest organ and it is responsible for 
decision-making.  It consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Economy of each of the member states.  Its decisions are binding 
upon the member states.199  The Common Market Group acts as the 
executive organ and is coordinated by the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs.  Its responsibilities include monitoring compliance, 
enforcing decisions, proposing measures for the execution of 
agreements, and drawing up programs of work to ensure progress 
towards the formation of a common market.200  The Common 
Market Group must include representatives from the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and of the Economy and the Central Bank of each 
State and a fourth member.201  Decisions of the Common Market 
Group take the form of Resolutions that are binding upon the 
member states.202  The MERCOSUR Trade Commission assists the 
Common Market Group in monitoring and ensuring that the 
common trade policy agreements between the states are applied.203  
Its decisions are given in the form of Directives or Proposals and 
are also binding on the member states.204  The Joint Parliamentary 
Commission is another structural organ of MERCOSUR comprised 
of members of parliament from each of the respective member 
nations, whose primary purpose is to ensure that decisions made 
through MERCOSUR are given priority and appropriate legislative 
approval, at the national level, in their respective legislative 
bodies.205  The Secretariat provides support for the operations of 
MERCOSUR.  It is based in Montevideo and has a small permanent 
staff.  Its mandate is modest, though efforts have been made to 
 
198 Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional 
Structure of MERCOSUR, art. 1, Dec. 17, 1994, 2145 U.N.T.S. 346 [hereinafter 
Protocol of Ouro Preto]. 
199 Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 198, art. 9. 
200 See id.  § 2 (describing the formation of the Common Market Group). 
201 Id. art. 11. 
202 Id. art 15. 
203 See id. art. 16. 
204 Id. art. 20. 
205 See id. art. 25 (“The Joint Parliamentary Commission shall endeavour to 
speed up the corresponding internal procedures.”). 
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broaden its scope by permitting it to provide technical assistance 
and to monitor compliance with regional integration objectives.206 
This framework suggests a level of centralization beyond mere 
inter-governmentalism.  MERCOSUR exists more than as a nexus 
point for individual action by its member states.  It appears to 
stand halfway between the construction of an autonomous supra 
state apparatus, like the European Union,207 and ALBA’s much 
more decentralized organization.  Yet, MERCOSUR has proven to 
be more impressive in theory than in practice, at least beyond the 
most basic level of integration.208  Some have concluded that it has 
been reduced to its symbolic value: “[n]otwithstanding the loss of 
political and economic relevance in recent years, Mercosur is still a 
mandatory topic of regional discourse, and the presidents of the 
four countries reinforce, from time to time, their commitment to 
the development of regional integration.”209  The focus is on 
opening trade between private enterprises.  Additionally, there is a 
focus on minimizing traditional state barriers to entry in the 
territory of other state participants.  The difficulties arise from 
tensions between the desire to integrate and the need to protect 
local enterprises from competition.  There is also little appetite for 
vesting supranational entities with substantial autonomy or direct 
regulatory power.210 Rule by consensus, inter-governmentalism, 
and protection against short term or local economic pain have 
limited the expansion of MERCOSUR as an autonomous regional 
authority. 
A similar model, with similar limitations, was proposed for the 
now dormant FTAA.211  Like MERCOSUR, the FTAA seeks to 
 
206 See PORRATA-DORIA, JR., supra note 183, at 32–33) (describing additional 
efforts by the Secretariat in recent years). 
207 On the organization of the European Union as an autonomous entity, see 
Larry Catá Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism and the 
European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173 (2001). 
208 See, e.g., Michael Mecham, Mercosur: A Failing Development Project?, 79 
INT’L AFF. 369, 372 (2003) (suggesting that South American nations are realizing 
that MERCOSUR and other regional integration projects are too strictly focused 
on economics and economic theory, but not on political realities). 
209 Welber Barral, Dispute Settlement and Legal Harmonization, in Mercosur, in 
HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND 
RESISTANCE 129, 131 (Larry Catá Backer ed., 2007). 
210 Id. at 137–39. 
211 For a history of the efforts to build a Free Trade Area of the Americas, see, 
e.g., Nicola Phillips, U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the 
Americas, 47 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 1 (2005); Eric Dannenmaier, Trade, 
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establish a free-trade area with a view to generating economic 
growth and prosperity, through market liberalization and 
expansion that result in contributing to the expansion of world 
trade,212 enhancing competition and improving market access 
conditions for goods and services among the Parties,213 eliminating 
barriers to the movement of capital and business persons among 
the Parties,214 and fostering the development of a hemispheric 
infrastructure.215  Like MERCOSUR, FTAA is administered 
through an organizational structure that is essentially inter-
governmental in character, and grounded in consensus and state 
party prerogative.  To this end, it is to be governed as a Council, 
Executive Committee, Civil Society Consultative Committee, 
Committee on the Differences in Levels of Development and Sizes 
of the Economies, a Secretariat, and other content-specific 
committees.216  The Council is composed of the ministers in charge 
of trade for each nation, and its duties are to periodically evaluate 
the implementation and the outcomes of the Agreement, to hear 
any other matter that could adversely affect the functioning of the 
Agreement, and to modify it in pursuance [of the objectives] of the 
Agreement.217  Decisions by the Council are supposed to be 
implemented by the member nations in accordance with their 
respective national legislations.218  The Executive Committee is 
composed of the vice ministers, or officials of an equivalent rank of 
each member nation.  Its duties include ensuring the fulfillment 
 
Democracy and the FTAA: Public Access to the Process of Constructing a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1066, 1069–73 (2004).  The FTAA 
website includes a history of the effort that ends in 2004.  See Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, Antecedents of the FTAA Process, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View 
_e.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
212 Free Trade Area of the Americas Draft Agreement, ch. II, art. 2, Nov. 21, 
2003, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp [hereinafter FTAA 
Draft Agreement] (listing as an objective “trade liberalization with a view to 
generate economic growth and prosperity, contributing to the expansion of world 
trade”). 
213 Id. (listing the enhancement of market conditions, “including in the area of 
government procurement”). 
214 Id. 
215 This latter goal is targeted to the facilitation of the circulation of goods, 
services, and investments; and to establish mechanisms that guarantee greater 
access to technology, through economic cooperation and technical assistance.  Id. 
216 Id. ch. XXI (outlining the institutional framework of the different bodies). 
217 Id. ch. XXI, art. 1 (detailing the composition and duties of the Council). 
218 Id. ch. XXIV, art. 2 (describing changes in Chapter XXI, article 1). 
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and enforcement of FTAA provisions, acting as a forum for 
negotiations, adopting decisions, establishing technical 
committees, and deciding on financial and managerial matters.219  
The Civil Society Consultative Committee is in charge of 
developing information systems for Civil Society on matters 
related to the FTAA.  It is also in charge of facilitating the 
formulation of positions, suggestions, contributions, and 
recommendations by civil society for the consideration of 
government.220 
Both models, in turn, reflect the inter-governmental, passive 
and consensus framework that has characterized the creation of 
supra-national organs to supervise economic integration in Latin 
America since ALADI.221  ALBA follows the same model, even as it 
furthers an ideological framework inimical to those of these other 
entities.  It has developed a similar set of institutions—all tightly 
dependent on the will of, and serving the interests of, the member 
states.  There is no autonomy in the supranational bodies that 
constitute ALBA.  The focus remains on state sovereign rights, and 
tight control of integration.  There is little in the construction of 
these organizations that suggest any move toward the 
development of autonomous supranational governance institutions 
with any sort of independent regulatory power.  These are passive, 
flow-through organizations.  They are more joint venture than 
integrative body.  In that respect, ALBA evidences similarities in its 
institutionalization to MERCOSUR, ALADI, and even its 
ideological nemesis, the FTAA.  That constitution of institutional 
presence reflects the primitive state of integration in Latin 
 
219 Id. ch. XXI, art. 2 (detailing the composition and duties of the Executive 
Committee). 
220 Id. art. 4. (detailing the composition and duties of the Civil Society 
Consultative Committee). 
221 ALADI itself is institutionalized through a Council of Foreign Ministers, a 
Conference of Evaluation and Convergence, and a Committee of Representatives.  
ALADI Treaty, supra note 183, art. 28.  The General Secretariat provides limited 
technical and administrative support.  Id. art. 29 (technical organ of the association 
[órgano técnico de la Asociación]).  The inter-governmental nature of ALADI is 
grounded in the character of its highest institutional body, the Council, which is to 
be made up of foreign ministers of member states and which has overall authority 
to direct the work of ALADI.  Id. arts. 30–31.  This intergovernmental body is 
convoked only at the instance of the Committee of Representatives, which 
constitutes the permanent body of the ALADI, id. art. 35, and is made up of 
representatives of each of the member states, id. art. 36.  The consensus aspect of 
the character of ALADI is assured by the imposition of a high vote requirement.  
Id. art. 37 (requiring a two thirds vote of all member states). 
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America.  It suggests that integration is better understood at the 
level of state-to-state relations—aggregated—than in grander 
organizations. 
But there are important differences as well.  MERCOSUR has 
embraced a greater willingness to construct a supra-national 
organizational apparatus under which integration efforts are 
overseen.  These include primitive dispute resolution provisions, 
that though essentially inter-governmental in character, suggest 
mechanisms beyond the state and mere political consultation.222  
On the other hand, ALBA suggests the possibility of building a 
framework of sector-driven integration through the work of its 
commissions—producing knowledge and suggestions, but leaving 
the actual construction and implementation of any 
recommendations to willing member states.  However, in each 
case, the supra-national element of these organizations tends to 
give way to its inter-governmental character.  As a consequence, 
there is a weak relationship between the goals of integration and 
institutional apparatus created to further that goal.  Sovereignty 
concerns and an unwillingness to trust a supra-national apparatus 
with its exercise, even in a tightly controlled delegated form, tend 
to reduce the efficacy of these systems as vehicles for integration.  
Instead, they serve as portals through which integration efforts can 
be undertaken directly between willing member states. 
3.2. ALBA and Trade Networks in the Caribbean—The CARICOM 
Connection 
In addition to its own programs, ALBA, especially through its 
member states, has also sought to reach out to other trade 
associations.  From these, it appears, that ALBA seeks both to 
engage globally, at least within the region inhabited by ALBA 
states, and also to use the connection to influence the way in which 
other regional trade associations function.  This is evident in the 
development of a relationship between ALBA and CARICOM.  
The relationship of CARICOM, a conventionally structured private 
markets oriented regional trade zone, with ALBA may provide 
insights into the compatibility and tensions between the 
ideological frameworks and implementations of these systems 
especially when they collide.  This section describes the evolution 
 
222 For a discussion and critique, see Barral, supra note 209. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/2
2010] FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 727 
 
of that relationship and the current status of the partnerships 
between CARICOM and ALBA member states, especially Cuba. 
What became CARICOM was founded in July of 1973 with the 
purpose of “establishing and utilizing institutions designed to 
enhance the economic, social and cultural development of their 
peoples.”223  The Treaty of Chaguaramas was amended by a 
Protocol in 2002 by which the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market were succeeded by the Caribbean Community 
including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, which shall 
assume the rights and obligations of the Caribbean Community 
and Common Market.224  The CARICOM agreement (treaty) aimed 
its efforts at establishing a “Common Market” whose aims are to: 
strengthen, coordinate, and regulate the economic and trade 
relations among member states in order to promote their 
accelerated, harmonious, and balanced development; to achieve 
the sustained expansion and continuing integration of economic 
activities, the benefits of which shall be equitably shared, taking 
into account the need to provide special opportunities for less 
developed countries; and to achieve a greater measure of economic 
independence and effectiveness of its member states in dealing 
with states, groups of states, and entities of whatever 
description.225  In order to achieve this economic development, the 
member nations are urged to harmonize their laws in a large 
number of areas, but this is to be achieved by individual action of 
assenting member states.226  In addition, under the CARICOM 
agreement, member states also pledge to establish a common 
external tariff227 as well as a common internal customs market in 
which the goods produced by the member states receive 
preferential treatments because no customs import duties can be 
 
223 Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, Pmbl., July 4, 1973, 946 
U.N.T. 17 [hereinafter Treaty of Chaguaramas]. 
224 Protocol on the Revision of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, art. I, Feb. 4, 2002, 
2260 U.N.T.S. 47 (“The Caribbean Community and Common Market shall be 
succeeded by the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market 
and Economy, which shall assume the rights and obligations of the Caribbean 
Community and Common Market.”). 
225 Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 223, Annex art. 4 (placing obligations 
on member states to implement and follow decisions of the CARICOM organs). 
226 Id. art. 42. 
227 Id. arts. 18, 31. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
728 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
placed on goods whose origins lie within the Common Market 
area.228 
In December of 1993, Cuba and the members of CARICOM 
established a joint commission “to promote co-operative relations 
between the Caribbean Community and Cuba in economic, social, 
cultural, and technological fields.”229  In addition, the agreement 
calls on the parties to “seek a greater understanding of each other’s 
views and positions on issues which may arise in the various 
regional and international forums, in an effort to promote closer 
relations in economic, social, cultural, and technological fields.”230  
The agreement incorporates the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States,231 which was adopted in 1979 at the Thirty-Fourth 
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.232  The 
U.N. Charter urges nations to “commit themselves effectively to 
achieving, through international negotiations and other concerted 
action, the restructuring of international economic relations on the 
basis of the principles of justice and equality in order to provide for 
steady economic development, with due regard to the 
development potential of developing countries.”233 
In July 2000, CARICOM and Cuba entered into a trade and 
economic cooperation agreement whose objectives included the 
promotion of trade in goods and services,234 and the cooperation by 
 
228 Id. arts. 17, 19.  Common Market Origin is defined in Article 14 of the 
Annex.  Id. art. 14.  The agreement also restricts a government’s ability to provide 
aid to certain domestic industries.  Id. art. 25.  Conversely, the agreement also 
strives to promote the industrial development of the less developed member 
nations, id. art. 56, and for the provision of financial assistance by the more 
developed to the less developed nations.  Id. art. 89. 
229 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Community (“CARICOM”)-Cuba 
Joint Commission, art. 3, Dec. 13, 1993, available at http://www.caricom.org 
/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_caricom_cuba_jointcommission.js
p?menu=secretariat. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. pmbl.  
232 Global Negotiations Relating to International Economic Co-operation for 
Development, G.A. Res. 34/138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/138 (Dec. 14, 1979). 
233 Id. 
234 Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement between Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) and Cuba, art. 2, July 5, 2000, available at http://www 
.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_caricom_cuba_2000 
.pdf. This provides:  
(i) the promotion and expansion of trade in goods and services 
originating in the territories of the Parties by means of, inter alia, free 
access to the markets of the Parties, elimination of non-tariff barriers to 
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the parties to become more efficient players in global markets.235  
This agreement also calls on the parties to grant greater and easier 
market access to each other’s respective markets,236 as well as 
economic cooperation237 and trade promotion among the signatory 
parties.238  The agreement also mentions a need to create better 
trade in services and tourism.239  Lastly, the agreement specifies 
with detail what is exempt and in what manner specific goods or 
services are to be implemented among the respective parties.240 
At first glance, the Cuba-CARICOM agreement appears to be a 
precursor to the framework that ALBA would later adopt.  For 
 
trade, the establishment of a system of rules of origin, and harmonization 
of technical, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures;  
(ii) the establishment of financial arrangements to facilitate the 
progressive development of two-way trade between the Parties;  
(iii) the progressive liberalization of trade in services. 
Id. 
235 Id.  This sets out a number of related objectives:  
(iv) the encouragement of one Party in the market of the other Party so as 
to enhance the competitiveness of the Parties in the world market;  
(v) the provision of facilities for the establishment and operation of joint 
ventures and other forms of economic co-operation activities;  
(vi) the development of mechanisms that promote and protect the 
investments made by nationals of the Parties;  
(vii) the promotion and development of co-operative activities;  
(viii) the promotion of an ongoing system of consultation and 
coordination for the exchange of information and views on economic and 
social matters of mutual interest and, where feasible, for the adoption of 
common positions at international forums and vis-a-vis third countries 
and groups of countries;  
(ix) the discouragement of anti-competitive business practices between 
the Parties;  
(x) the continuity and progress of work initiated within the CARICOM-
Cuba Joint Commission (the Joint Commission) established by both 
Parties for the development of mutual relations. 
Id. 
236 Id. art. 5. 
237 Id. art. 10. 
238 Id. art. 12. 
239 Id. arts. 15–16. 
240 Id. Annexes I–V. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
730 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
instance, both agreements call for developmental assistance by the 
wealthier to the less wealthy.  Similarly, both agreements, at least 
on paper, seem to focus the bulk of their emphasis on promoting 
greater welfare for the majority of a member nation’s population.  
However, the means by which this is accomplished varies.  
CARICOM, I would argue, falls more in line with regional trade 
agreements such as the FTAA or MERCOSUR.  To CARICOM’s 
credit, the emphasis of their agreement is mutual cooperation, 
growth, and prosperity for all members.  These goals, although 
spelled out in the text of both the FTAA and MERCOSUR, do not 
apply, in practice, as much as they do with CARICOM.  ALBA, in 
contrast, is based more on a barter system, in which the specialty of 
one nation (i.e., Cuban doctors) is exchanged for what is abundant 
in another (i.e., Venezuelan petroleum). 
Conversely, an increasing number of CARICOM member states 
have sought to remain within CARICOM and also join ALBA.  
Dominica is one state with membership in both organizations.  
Other states have sought to adhere to the ideological principles of 
ALBA, but not join it.241  This has caused some controversy within 
CARICOM.  The sentiment in early 2009 appears to favor that 
ALBA member states enter into agreements with CARICOM, 
similar to that entered into with Cuba, rather than encouraging 
CARICOM states to join ALBA.242  Still, those CARICOM member 
states seeking entry into ALBA have done so precisely because 
they believe that ALBA is “just another avenue for obtaining 
economic aid which is not available in Caricom.”243  While there is 
concern that ALBA might undermine the integration efforts 
represented by CARICOM, others have suggested that the 
 
241 For example, in February 2007, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines signed a statement expressing support for the ALBA 
principles and committing themselves to working towards creating collaboration 
between ALBA and CARICOM.  See St. Vincent Treading Cautiously with Chavez’s 
ALBA Deal, CANA NEWS, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.cananews.net 
/news/131/ARTICLE/20927/2008-01-30.html.  Other countries have worried 
that joining ALBA might somehow impact on their CARICOM obligations.  Id. 
242 However, Prime Minister Gonsalves has stated that it would be “ideal if 
like Cuba, all the other member countries of ALBA pursue trade agreement with 
CARICOM.”  Id. 
243 Vaughn Lewis, ALBA Seen as Avenue to Economic Aid for Small CARICOM 
States, STABROEK NEWS, Feb. 3, 2008, http://www.stabroeknews.com/2008/news 
/local/02/03/alba-seen-as-avenue-to-economic-aid-for-small-caricom-states-prof   
-vaughan-lewis/. 
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proliferation of trade powers is a sign of the waning of American 
power in the region.244 
But the real lesson in Cuba-ALBA-CARICOM relations is the 
multiple vectors of that framework.  The issues arising among the 
states with connections to both trade groups exist precisely because 
the web of trade relationships is both complex and dense.  But, it is 
denser than suggested merely by looking at trade relationships.  
Movements of capital as well as goods are key to understanding 
the nature of economic integration among states.  The investment 
practices provide another test of the distinctiveness of trade and 
investment regimes where interactions are ideologically tinged by 
groups grounded in incompatible ideological framework.  For that 
purpose, it is worth looking briefly at the construction of webs of 
investment relationships through bilateral investment treaties, a 
subject taken up in the next Section. 
3.3. ALBA in a Region of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Partial 
Preference Trade Agreements 
In some ways more important to regional trade than these 
multilateral trade arrangements, bi-lateral trade agreements 
(“BITs”) among Latin American States have become more 
important over the last thirty years.245  It is true that BITs do not 
cover the same ground as many trade agreements, but there is 
enough of an overlap to suggest an approach to an important 
sector of trade relations between states, one that focuses on 
investment and services.  For this purpose, this Article considers 
three categories of BITs.  The first include those between the 
United States and ALBA member states.246  The second group 
 
244 See generally Norman Girvan, ALBA, Petocaribe and CARICOM: Issues in a 
New Dynamic, Oct. 23, 2008, http://alainet.org/images/Girvan%20ALBA                  
% 20PETROCARIBE%20AND%20CARICOM.pdf (suggesting that CARICOM 
coordinate its relations with ALBA). 
245 For a history, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, UNCTAD/ITE/ILA/2 (2000). 
246 Those considered include: Treaty Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Nicar, July 1, 
1995, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-33, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/BITS 
/usanic_e.asp [hereinafter U.S.-Nicar. BIT]; Treaty Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Bol., Apr. 17, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-26, available at http://www.unctad.org 
/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_bolivia.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Bol. BIT]. 
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considered is between ALBA member states other than Cuba.247  
The last group to be considered consists of BITs between Cuba and 
ALBA and non-ALBA member states.248  All of these BITs share a 
common set of objectives—to promote economic cooperation, 
protect investors and safeguard their investment activities, and 
provide a framework for the regulation of those relations to 
increase mutual economic activity and prosperity.  Beyond this, the 
similarities and differences among these groups of BITs might 
better suggest the larger differences in trade philosophy and 
approaches that find their way into multilateral arrangements like 
ALBA, MERCOSUR, and FTAA.  Indeed, together these 
arrangements provide a comprehensive window on state-to-state 
trade and investment relations that might be overlooked in 
examining the grander projects of ALBA, MERCOSUR and FTAA. 
The American BITs can serve as a benchmark of sorts.  They 
come closest to the private global market ethos of modern 
economic globalization.249  These BITs are variations on the 
standard form of bilateral investment treaty that the United States 
uses as a basis for its BITs.250  The U.S.-Nicaragua BIT and the U.S.-
Bolivia BIT conform generally to the model U.S. BIT.  In both cases, 
the respective BITs cover a large class of investments made, 
owned, or controlled directly or indirectly by a nation or company 
of the other state, including intellectual property.251  Provision is 
 
247 Those considered include: Negociaciones Entre el Gobierno de la 
República de Bolivia y el Gobierno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela para 
un Acuerdo Sobre Promoción y Protección recíproca de inversions [Negotiations 
between the Government of the Republic of Bolivia and the Government of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for an Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments], Bol.-Venez., Mar. 31, 2000, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/bolivia_venezuela_sp.pdf 
[hereinafter Bol.-Venez. BIT]. 
248 Those considered include: Acuerdo entre la República de Bolivia y la 
República de Cuba para la promoción y protección de inversions [Agreement 
between the Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Cuba for the promotion and 
protection of investments], May 6, 1995, available at http://www.unctad.org/ 
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/cuba_bolivia_sp.pdf [hereinafter Bol.-Cuba BIT]. 
249 For a discussion of that system, see, e,g., Catá Backer, supra note 9. 
250 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection Of Investment, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade 
_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf [hereinafter 
2004 Model BIT]. 
251 U.S.-Nicar. BIT, supra note 246, art. I, § 1(d); U.S.-Boliv. BIT, supra note 246, 
art. 1, § 1. 
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made for the equal treatment of investors and investments in the 
host state, protection against expropriation and compensation 
therefrom,252 most favored nation treatment,253 free movement of 
capital in and out of host states,254 protection of loss from war or 
other civil disturbances,255 prohibitions from host state enactment 
of a number of provisions affecting the manner in which 
investments are carried out within its territory,256 movements of 
investors in and out of the host state,257 and dispute resolution 
provisions, including the provision of arbitration for disputes 
among the state parties or between a state-party and an investor.258  
The U.S. BITs also include provisions peculiar to its embargo 
against Cuba.259 
One would expect to see the trade philosophy of ALBA 
reflected to some extent in the way in which BITs between ALBA 
members, and especially in BITs with Cuba, are structured.  Yet, on 
examination, it is clear that whatever differences exist between 
these investor arrangements and the U.S. BIT model are subtle.  
The most prominent difference is with respect to conditions to 
investment.  The provisions in U.S. BITs with Nicaragua and 
Bolivia limiting host state power to legislate rules burdening 
inbound investment with respect to labor, investment, and other 
factors in operation260 are absent in the BITs among ALBA states, 
including those with Cuba.  The effect can be substantial.  
 
252 See U.S.-Nicar. BIT, supra note 246, art. III. 
253 See id. art. II. 
254 See id. art. V. 
255 See id. art. IV. 
256 In the U.S.-Nicar. BIT, for example, the treaty prohibits national 
legislation, applicable to covered investments, prohibitions against host country 
investments that mandate particular levels of local content, purchases or 
preferences to local goods or services, limitations on the import of products or 
services, the export of services, limits on sales in the host state territory, 
mandatory rules for transfers of technology, and mandatory local investments in 
research and development.  Id. art. VI, §§ a-f.  These limits are reproduced, in 
substantial respect in the U.S.-Boliv. BIT.  See U.S.-Boliv. BIT, supra note 246, art. 
VI, §§ a-f. 
257 See U.S.-Nicar. BIT, supra note 246, art. VII. 
258 See id. arts. IX-X; U.S.-Boliv. BIT, supra note 246, arts. IX-X. 
259 See, e.g., U.S.-Nicar. BIT, supra note 246, art. XII (benefits of the BIT not 
available “if nationals of a third country own or control the company and . . . the 
denying party does not maintain normal economic relations with the third 
country”). 
260 See discussion, supra note 256, listing prohibitions limiting host state 
power in U.S.-Nicar. BIT. 
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Moreover, the BITs among ALBA members include a “shut down” 
clause, permitting a host state to suspend free movement of 
investments during times of exceptional economic difficulties.261  
Indeed, in the Bolivia-Cuba BIT, all investments are made subject 
to local law without limit.262  The idea is that Cuba and its 
investment partner will promote and create unspecified conditions 
favorable to investment in their respective territories, and on that 
basis authorize investment in conformity with its laws.263  The 
Bolivia-Cuba BIT also exempts from its most favored nation 
provisions the benefits of any arrangements effected through free 
trade agreements or customs unions.264 
This discussion of BITs highlights certain tensions and 
incongruities.  First, ALBA member states have not deepened their 
trade arrangements with each other through bilateral investment 
treaties to any great extent.  This is curious, given the importance 
of control and coordination implicit as an ALBA ideal.  Thus, for 
example, Nicaragua has no bilateral investment treaty 
arrangements with Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia or Dominica; 
however, it has entered into such arrangements with the United 
States, a number of European states, China, Korea, Chile, and El 
Salvador.265  Likewise, Venezuela has no bilateral investment 
arrangements with the United States, China, or other ALBA 
states.266  It is possible to rationalize that omission by reference to 
ALBA’s principles privileging trade at the state-to-state level.  But, 
Venezuela is not consistent in this regard, maintaining private 
sector investment treaties with a number of European and Latin 
American States.267  Bolivia, on the other hand, has entered into 
such arrangements with Cuba and Venezuela, but not with 
 
261 See, e.g., Bol.-Venez. BIT, supra note 247, art. 6 (“[i]n case of the existence of 
exceptional difficulties or the balance of payments is severely unequal”). 
262 See Bol.-Cuba BIT, supra note 248, art. II.2. 
263 See id. art. II.1 (“Each contracting party will promote and create favorable 
conditions in their territory for investments and investors of the other contracting 
party will authorize such investments in accordance with their laws.”). 
264 See id. art. III.3. 
265 SICE: Foreign Trade Information System, Information on Nicaragua: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/NIC/NICBits 
_e.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
266 SICE: Foreign Trade Information System, Information on Venezuela: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/VEN/VENBits 
_e.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
267 Id. 
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Nicaragua or Dominica.268  And it has arrangements with the 
United States, Chile, and Argentina, but not Brazil.  Second, those 
BITs entered into by ALBA state parties tend to reflect the same 
private market orientation one encounters in BITs with the United 
States.  There are notable exceptions—and principally focused on 
the extent of the application of local law to require local 
participation in inbound investments.  But otherwise, the form is 
similar.269 
The incongruities become larger when understood in the 
context of the networks of private sector-oriented free trade 
arrangements in which ALBA member states also participate, in 
addition to the great organizations like MERCOSUR and the 
Andean Community.  In some respects, these arrangements seem 
to mimic the networks of investment arrangements that are formed 
by the large number of crisscrossing bilateral investment treaties 
among these states.270  Nicaragua, for example, participates in free 
trade arrangements with Mexico and the Dominican Republic, and 
has entered into partial preferential agreements with Venezuela, 
Columbia, and Panama.271  The Nicaragua-Venezuela partial 
preference agreement is particularly interesting.272  It focuses on 
 
268 SICE: Foreign Trade Information System, Information on Bolivia: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/BOL/BOLBITs_e.asp 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
269 This is not to suggest that the substantive differences in implementation 
may not be significant.  Because of the conformity with local laws provisions in 
the Cuba BITs, for example, it may be more difficult to obtain the necessary 
permits to invest in Cuba than in more private market oriented states.  That is the 
intended result.  See, e.g., Bol.-Cuba BIT, supra note 248, art. I.1 (defining 
investment by reference to conformity to the laws of the host state by stipulating 
“as long as it was made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the 
contracting party in whose territory the investment was made”). 
270 Indeed, ALADI describes these arrangements as the instrument most 
often used to effect steps toward integration, noting both the flexibility of this 
form of trade arrangement and the variety of forms that they may take, producing 
a great dynamism within integration efforts.  ALADI, Acuerdos de Alcance 
Parcial [Partially Reached Agreements], http://www.aladi.org/nsfaladi                     
/arquitec.nsf/VSITIOWEB/Inf_acuerdos_de_alcance_parcial_acdos (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2010) (“Due to their flexibility, these agreements are the most used 
instruments in regional integration, such that the business negotiated in this type 
of agreement has shown greater dynamism throughout the intra-regional trade 
group.”). 
271 SICE: Foreign Trade Information System, Information on Nicaragua: 
Trade Agreements in Force, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/NIC/ 
NICagreements_e.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2010. 
272 Acuerdo de Alcance Parcial entre la República de Nicaragua y la 
República de Venezuela [Partially Reached Agreement Between the Republic of 
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economic integration of the private sectors of their respective 
economies through the usual form—reductions to barriers to entry 
maintained by the state parties.  Venezuela maintains similar 
partial preferential agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
CARICOM, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Guyana.273  Though several predate the 
current Chavez regime’s focus on state control of the economy, it 
remains in force.  And indeed, in light of ALBA, the Venezuela-
Cuba partial preference arrangement might raise ideological 
eyebrows.274 
All of these treaties, perhaps in the aggregate, are meant to 
advance the project of Latin American economic integration—a 
project also near to the core of ALBA values.  And, indeed, many 
fall within the free ranging framework of ALADI275 and article 14 
 
Nicaragua and the Republic of Venezuela], Aug. 15, 1986, AAP. T.S. No. 25 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/vennic/vennic1.asp#CAP%C3 
%8DTULO_I_. 
273 SICE: Foreign Trade Information System, Information on Venezuela: 
Trade Agreements in Force, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/VEN/ 
VENagreements_e.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
274 However, this agreement must be considered in the context of a number 
of others between Cuban and various Latin American states, each of which (and 
all together) were designed to attempt Cuba’s reintegration into the ALADI 
system.  Asociación Latinamericana de Integración [Latin American Association 
of Integration], Acuerdos de Alcance Parcial: Acuerdo de Preferencias Fijas 
[Partially Reached Agreements: Fixed Preferences Agreement], http://www.aladi 
.org/nsfaladi/arquitec.nsf/VSITIOWEB/Inf_acuerdos_de_alcance_parcial_acdos 
(last visited February 27, 2010) (“In the first place the agreements were derived 
from the incorporation of Cuba into the Association: ACE 40 (Cuba—Venezuela), 
ACE 42 (Cuba—Chile), ACE 46 (Cuba—Ecuador), ACE 47 (Cuba—Bolivia), ACE 
49 (Cuba—Colombia), ACE 50 (Cuba—Perú), ACE 51 (Cuba—México) and ACE 
62 (Cuba—MERCOSUR).”) (translation by author). 
275 ALADI, the Latina American Integration Association (Asociación 
Latinamericana de Integración) was established by the Treaty of Montevideo in 
1980 by twelve states: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  ALADI, Acerca de ALADI: 
¿Quienes somos? [About ALADI: Who are we?], http://www.aladi.org 
/nsfaladi/arquitec.nsf/VSITIOWEB/quienes_somos (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).  It 
is meant to serve as the umbrella organization through which webs of trade and 
investment relationships among the members may ultimately produce, in the 
aggregate, an economically unified Latin America.   
[ALADI] considers the horizontal cooperation with other integration 
movements around the world and partial actions with developing states 
in development o their respective areas of integration (Article 27). The 
judicial structure of ALADI is one of the most vigorous sub-regional 
agreements, plurilateral and bilateral integrations are increasingly 
emerging on the continent (Andean Community of Nations, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/2
2010] FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 737 
 
of the Treaty of Montevideo.276  Thus: “These agreements could be 
commercial, economic complementation, agricultural, promotion 
of trade, or adopt other modalities in accordance with the 14th 
article of the Treaty of Montevideo 1980.  The basic norms and 
procedures that regulate these agreements are contained in the 
ALAC/CM/Resolution 2 on August 12, 1980 by the cabinet.”277  
Certainly, from the Cuban perspective, ALBA has been offered as 
an important form of integration that might be privileged within 
the ALADI framework.278 
3.4. So, What Makes ALBA Different? 
The description of the conventional forms of regional trade and 
bilateral investment agreements suggests the contours of the 
differences between the approach of ALBA—in theory and 
operation—and traditional approaches to these relationships.  This 
section first highlights those differences and then analyses whether 
those differences matter. 
 
MERCOSUR, etc.). Consequently, it is up to the Association—as an 
institutional and normative framework or ‘umbrella’ for regional 
integration—to develop actions designed to help and promote these 
efforts in order to make them gradually converge to create a common 
economic space.   
Id.  Within the context of ALADI, ALBA is both unconventional but 
simultaneously an integral step toward integration. 
276 ALADI Treaty, supra note 183.  ALALC/CM/Resolution 2 imposes a 
number of substantive and procedural rules for the creation of these partial scope 
agreements among ALADI member states.  These are designed to help bring a 
small amount of order and impose a similar direction of what is contemplated to 
be a thick network of individual and partial arrangements that will vary among 
different clusters of states over different aspects of economic life.  See id. resolution 
2 (providing for the conclusion of partial scope agreements and prescribing 
substantive and procedural rules). 
277 ALADI, Partially Reached Agreements, supra note 270. 
278 See Necesitamos Procesos Integradores, Afirma Cuba en ALADI [Cuba Affirms 
ALADI], CMKX RADIO BAYAMO, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.radiobayamo.icrt 
.cu/pdf.php?id=1838 (noting that Cuba affirms the need for the integrated 
process in ALADI).  Ricardo Cabrisas, the Cuban minister noted this explicitly 
stating:  
[w]e share the aspiration of improving the lives of our people and we 
have a way to integrate the project, which is the Treaty of Montevideo 
1980.  Within the Treaty, and respecting its principles . . . we have to look 
at other approaches and experiments that would permit the acceleration 
of a truly integrated process within ALADI. 
  Id. 
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3.4.1. Differences in Theory 
The difference that stands out the most when comparing these 
two systems is the fundamental focus of these arrangements.  
Conventional agreements relating to trade and investment are 
focused on private and market activity.  To the extent that states 
are involved, it is as guarantors of that private activity under sets 
of identifiable rules.  States may participate in these efforts, but 
only as private parties.279  ALBA represents a significant effort to 
reorient private markets to public purpose, and to transfer 
authority from the private to the state sector.  But, ALBA does not 
represent the only current attempt through which states have 
sought to intervene in global private markets.  Sovereign wealth 
funds represent another potent vector of that activity, though in 
that case, states seek to enter markets as private rather than public 
actors.280 
Indeed, the ALBA system, presents almost the inverse 
proposition:  the principal focus is on the public activities of states.  
Where private activity is an issue, it is deemed to exist to serve the 
greater interests of public policy represented solely by and through 
the state.  The foundation is socialist, but in the Stalinist tradition 
rather than in its modern Chinese form.  Supranational interaction 
must be controlled by the state, serve the interests of states, and 
focus on public policy.  Trade and investment are instruments of 
public policy, as are the economic activities of non-state actors 
within and between ALBA states.  Private capital and its creation, 
exchange and accumulation is viewed as incidental to a primary 
focus grounded in political assessments of actions constituting 
advances in the general welfare of all the inhabitants of the nations 
 
279 The essence of these notions is well articulated in efforts directed at states 
seeking to intervene in private global financial markets as participants rather than 
as regulators.  See INT’L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE: “SANTIAGO 
PRINCIPLES” 3–5 (2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng 
/santiagoprinciples.pdf (recognizing the growing number of sovereign wealth 
funds, investment funds owned by general governments, and seeking to establish 
principles to describe their practices).  On the public-in-form but private-in-
function approach to state participation in financial markets, see Larry Catá 
Backer, The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund: Between Private and Public, 40 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 1271 (2009). 
280 See Backer, supra note 279, at 1272 (noting that sovereign wealth funds 
allow states to participate in markets as private actors). 
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involved.281  That is not to say that capital is not important or 
necessary, but rather, that the character of arrangements between 
states has changed.  It is no longer focused on eliminating borders for 
the production and management of private capital; instead it is 
focused on using borders as a site for the assertion of public 
authority to control all aspects of social, political, cultural, and 
economic activity. 
These ideological foundations produce second-order effects as 
well.  First, they serve as a vehicle for the transfer of power from 
non-state to state actors.  The object is not to clear a space for 
private activity; rather it is to enlarge the space for state action and 
control over the means of the production of political, social, and 
economic power.  This is a necessary consequence of ideologies 
based on mass social political movements.  Furthermore, ALBA 
calls on its members to mutually cooperate with one another in 
ensuring that complementary actions are taken in order to improve 
efficiency and promote the ultimate goal of integration.  The BITS 
and other regional trade agreements discussed, with the exception 
of MERCOSUR, do not have integration as a goal.  Rather, their 
focus is on establishing a mechanism that facilitates the exchange 
of goods and capital between nations.  In many instances though, 
the exchange of goods and capital tends to be more one-sided, a 
complaint that is echoed in ALBA’s calls for a movement away 
from the status quo Neo-liberal method of market and capital 
creation and exchange. 
3.4.2. Differences in Organizational Operation 
ALBA and the F.T.A.A. have much more in common when it 
comes to the area of operation than one would suspect.  Unlike 
MERFCOSUR, where supranational decisions can be made and 
 
281 Charles H. Blake, The Dynamics of Economic Integration in Venezuela and 
Their Implications for the FTAA Process, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 81, 82 (2009). 
[Venezuela’s Hugo] Chávez spoke increasingly of a transition in 
Venezuela toward ‘twenty-first century socialism’ and of a [Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Peoples of Our America] in which like-minded 
countries could join Venezuela in refusing to participate in the FTAA 
process. Chávez asserted that the FTAA was an extension of the U.S. 
empire in the Americas. 
Id.  
See also id. at 98 (“As an alternative to the FTAA, Chávez promoted ALBA as a 
model centered on social welfare and mutual assistance rather than on free 
trade.”). 
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enforced through the Common Market Group, ALBA and the 
FTAA rely on each respective nation to adopt any policy decisions 
or changes made at the regional level.  This could be interpreted as 
being a weakness in the ability to enforce said decisions or 
changes.  Conversely though, it could be argued that this method 
allows a nation and its people a greater say in what its country will 
and will not do.  The main difference, ALBA proponents would 
argue, is that under ALBA it is indeed the people who make the 
decisions, and not multinational corporations, as would be the case 
under the FTAA.  Along these lines, another noteworthy 
operational difference between ALBA and the FTAA involves the 
beneficiaries of the policies enacted. 
3.4.3. Do the Differences Matter? 
The differences between the ALBA approach and the FTAA 
approach are revolutionary in the sense that, under ALBA, the 
state is attempting to become the main player within the traditional 
capitalist system.  Yet that revolutionary approach is, in a sense, a 
reaction as well.  ALBA seeks to invert the vectors of social and 
political movements back to a framework that privileged the state 
over all other institutions, and that sought to invest the state, and 
its apparatus, with a monopoly of authority over politics, society 
and economics.  The now ancient, and from a Chinese perspective, 
anachronistic, framework is heavily grounded on traditional 
Marxist-Leninist notions from the first half of the twentieth 
century.282  Rather than continue with the existing process of 
transnational integration within which private multinational 
corporations are the main players and main beneficiaries of 
bilateral and multinational trade agreements, ALBA aims to 
construct both public markets and public multinational enterprises.  
ALBA would use the government apparatus as a public leveraging 
mechanism that can compete with and against these corporations 
within markets that are grounded in public rather than private 
incentive structures.  Yet this difference is also embedded in larger 
global systems that remain firmly framed within dominant private 
 
282 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the 
Crossroads: Cuban Marxism, Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 
14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337 (2004) (discussing the possibility of 
Cuba’s adoption of the Chinese model to engaging globalization in order to 
remain consistent with its Marxist-Leninist principles). 
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and stateless system of global intercourse.  That has consequences 
that remain to be worked through. 
Among the more interesting consequences are those attached 
to the new state multinational enterprise program.  The power and 
ability of ALBA’s grannational enterprises to compete will depend 
on the size and success of ALBA and its members.  But it may also 
entangle these enterprises within the matrix of global soft 
regulation of multinational enterprises,283 among the more 
important of which are the OECD´s Guidelines for Multinational 
Corporations284 and the United Nations Global Compact.285  The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”) is comprised of a number of democratic, market 
economy governments focused on regulating and harmonizing 
development around the world.286  The Guidelines for 
Multinational Corporations represent the joint efforts of these 
countries to provide a normative framework for enterprise 
operation.  It has already begun to produce regulatory activity, 
 
283 See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility and International 
Law: The Case of Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 431, 
431–39 (Doreen McBarnet, et al. eds., 2007) (discussing examples of the 
entanglement of grannational and multinational enterprises). 
284 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. [OECD] DIRECTORATE FOR 
FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428 
.pdf.  
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are the most 
comprehensive instrument in existence today for corporate responsibility 
multilaterally agreed by governments.  Adhering governments—
representing all regions of the world and accounting for 85 per cent of 
foreign direct investment—are committed to encouraging enterprises 
operating in their territory to observe a set of widely recognised 
principles and standards for responsible business conduct wherever they 
operate. 
Id. 
285 See generally Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) 
(prepared by John Ruggie) (discussing the development of these programs).  See 
also ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS, 218–24 
(2006) (discussing the genesis of the Global Compact). 
286 See OECD, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en 
_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (describing the organization of the 
OECD). 
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especially in Europe.287  One proceeding touched on the behavior 
of a multinational corporation operating within a conflict zone.288  
The other touched on similar issues but for a situation in which the 
entity operated through supply chain relationships.289  In both 
cases, the companies were required to conform to international 
standards through the soft law system in which their home states 
adhered.  Cuban corporations operating within the jurisdictions 
within which these regulatory regimes are strong would have to 
reconcile their own ALBA norms with those of the OECD.290 
Similarly, the object of the Global Compact is to ‘mainstream’ 
the principles by encouraging behaviors consistent with the 
underlying principles.291  The U.N. has described its Global 
Compact as “a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are 
committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten 
universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor, 
environment and anti-corruption.”292  The Global Compact project 
has seen the establishment of a large network of actors charged 
with producing systems that might enhance the success of this 
mainstreaming in aid of the overall objectives of the U.N.  This 
mainstreaming in turn embraced the idea that “international 
political authority derives not only from rules and procedures, but 
also from the principles that establish the normative framework for 
 
287 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Rights And Accountability In Development 
‘Raid’ v. Das Air And Global Witness v. Afrimex; Small Steps Towards an Autonomous 
Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELB. 
J. INT’L. L., 258 (2009) (recounting these efforts). 
288 See generally United Kingdom National Contact Point, Statement By The 
United Kingdom National Contact Point (NCP) For OECD Guidelines For Multinational 
Enterprises (NCP): Das Air (Jul. 21, 2008), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files 
/file47346.doc (discussing the operation of Das Air in a conflict zone). 
289 See generally United Kingdom National Contact Point, Final Statement by 
the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 
Afrimex (UK) Ltd. (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files 
/file47555.doc (discussing the operation of Afrimex through supply 
relationships). 
290 See Jean d’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for 
New Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1077–81 (2008) (providing a discussion 
of the dangers and a critique of such systems for soft law). 
291 U.N. Global Compact, Overview of the U.N. Global Compact, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/ (last visited February, 27, 
2010) (giving a general description of the U.N. Global Compact organization). 
292 Id.  
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multilateral agreements.”293  Like the OECD system, this soft law 
system is aimed to buttress a private market driven system in 
which the state plays a subordinate role, the inverse of the ALBA 
project.  Apposite is the understanding that “many people who use 
the term ‘soft law’ pejoratively often are concerned less with the 
alleged fictitious character of certain prescriptions that purport to 
be law . . . and much more with the redistribution of political 
power in certain arenas of international lawmaking.”294  The 
political dimensions of these efforts are well known and inimical to 
the project ALBA states seek to effect; conflict is likely. 
It is not clear that ALBA’s grannacional (grandnational) 
principles are compatible with those of the OECD or the Global 
Compact.  It is possible that they might overlap, but they are 
distinct in several respects.  Within ALBA, that may make no 
difference.  However, outside of ALBA, and especially within 
Global Compact or OECD adhering jurisdictions, the potential for 
conflict intensifies.  Moreover, operating in the form of 
grannacional (grandnational) enterprises may also affect the extent 
and nature of sovereign immunity as these enterprises seek to 
project their activities beyond ALBA. 
The grannacional enterprise, like the ALBA food bank and the 
ALBA emphasis on asymmetrical trade arrangements grounded on 
public needs as determined by states, deepens the conclusion that 
ALBA represents a substantially distinct conception of regional 
trade associations.  In place of a model grounded in an active role 
of private economic actors and a passive regulatory role for states, 
ALBA posits an active role for states in trade as principals, as well 
as a regulatory role in that trade.  In effect, it suggests that states 
remain sovereign entities and economic bodies simultaneously.  
This suggests an amalgamation of the public and private spheres, 
which is almost the inverse of what is developing in the United 
 
293 Georg Kell & David Levin, The Evolution of the Global Compact 
Network: An Historic Experiment in Learning and Action 4 (Aug. 11–14, 2002) 
(unpublished paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual 
Conference: “Building Effective Networks”), http://www.unglobalcompact.Org 
/docs/news_events/9.5/denver.pdf.  See also JOHN RUGGIE, WINNING THE PEACE: 
AMERICA AND WORLD ORDER IN THE NEW ERA (1996) (discussing the multilateral 
framework needed for establishing a new world order). 
294 G. F. Handl et al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, in TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 333, 337 (A.A. Fatouros 
ed., 1994) (quoting W. Michael Reisman). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
744 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
States and Europe.295  This is effected, however, through an 
organizational structure that remains heavily dependent on the 
state, tightly controls the ability of ALBA to evolve into an 
autonomous organization furthering its own ideological basis, and 
mimics, in substantial respect the outward forms of traditional 
approaches to integration in Latin America.  That mixed message 
helps ALBA by emphasizing its attachment to conventional forms 
of organization and implementation, but it also hurts ALBA by 
appearing to reduce it to just another variation in traditional 
approaches to integration well understood within the ALADI 
umbrella.  That mixed message is ultimately confusing, both 
internally and externally to the construction of the sort of 
institution implied by its organizing ideology. 
Yet the differences between ALBA and conventional free trade 
arrangements ought not to be completely dismissed.  Those 
differences extend beyond its ideological basis to its 
implementation.  Though the organization is still quite young, it 
has been active enough to give us a sense of its operation.  It 
commodifies public as well as private goods—from teachers to 
doctors, along with goods and services—the usual subject of trade 
and trade regulation.  In this sense, at least, ALBA represents, in 
part, a return to a command economy basis of economic 
organization—and an extension of command economy principles 
to economic relations among states.  Whether plural systems—
combinations of command and private economy—can co-exist in a 
way that is efficient or stable, however, has yet to be seen.  ALBA 
will serve as a great experiment in this respect.  Its outcome is by 
no means certain. 
For the moment, however, ALBA’s greatest contribution might 
well be its ideology.296  Its mere existence serves as a basis for 
challenging assumptions in the creation and implementation of 
methods of integration.  It provides a base through which this 
distinctive ideological voice can be leveraged.  Understood as an 
ideological joint venture among its participants, ALBA represents a 
 
295 See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public 
Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law 
Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801 (2008) (examining the 
development of a European framework for the law applicable to state private 
interventions in which private and public law are not separable and in conflict but 
in which states substitute actions in the private law realm for sovereign activity). 
296 This has been particularly acute within CARICOM states.  See discussion 
supra Section 3.2. 
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space within which a consensus on alternatives to the existing 
preeminent economic model of globalization might be constructed.  
For that purpose it provides a safe space, not within the territory of 
any of the state participants, and detached from the governments 
of each of them.  In this aspect, ALBA may make its most potent 
contribution to current debates about the form and principles of 
economic integration grounded in trade relations among states and 
their populations.  This is a potent weapon in states with large 
classes of poor people—people who vote.  Even the smallest 
implementation of the ideological framework of ALBA has the 
potential to change the political dialog in many states in Latin 
America.  This may represent Cuba’s most imposing challenge to 
the developed world.  If successful, ALBA could reign in a new era 
of trade and commerce whose primary interest is the welfare of all 
people, and not merely just profits, as the standard mode of 
operation.  Still, whether Bolivar’s dream can indeed become a 
reality remains to be seen.  In the face of a flexible and resourceful 
opponent, one that can embrace ALBA’s core ideology without its 
politics, that challenge will not go unmet. 
4. TENSIONS AND CONNECTIONS 
This article has suggested both the singularity of ALBA and its 
connection with the now almost ancient tradition of trade 
integration that has also marked Latin American interstate 
economic relations.  In lieu of a conclusion—for a conclusion is 
premature with respect to an entity that is so young and 
unformed—this section will suggest the six great points of tension 
and connection that ALBA represents within traditional models of 
trade and investment and among the state system in Latin 
America. 
First, ALBA implicates the tension between integration and 
nationalism.  This tension implicates the construction of hierarchies 
between states.  It also implicates hierarchy between national and 
supranational governance organs.  ALBA tilts heavily toward the 
ALADI model of partial integration.  The great innovation of 
ALBA is that partial integration under its model is heavily 
controlled by states, rather than by individuals acting through 
private markets that cross state borders.  But ALBA is more leery of 
the use of integration as a doorway for the creation of autonomous 
supranational organs.  The Model of European Union integration, 
and even of the much milder form of MERCOSUR integration, is 
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rejected in favor of substantial “inter-governmentalism.”  ALBA 
provides an ideological space through which states can trade at the 
public level among each other and with everyone else.  Beyond that 
lies the great unknown. 
Second, ALBA implicates the tension between integration that 
is controlled or directed by or for the private sector and that 
controlled or directed for the public sector.  This tension implicates 
the understanding of the fundamental nature of trade and 
investment policy, or at least, of the fundamental driving force of 
trade.  It suggests a tension in the understanding of borders—
either as the marker of the limits of state economic power to be 
deployed by with or against other states, or as a porous barrier to 
certain activities (population movements and the provision of 
social welfare benefits) but not to others (economic activities) 
which respect to which borders essentially disappear.  It thus also 
suggests the limits of state power over economic activity both as a 
physical reality and as a substantive policy value.297  ALBA tilts 
heavily toward a public market model.  This model appears to 
manifest a traditional socialist internationalism.  However, it is 
more than that: it is socialist internationalism updated by the 
incorporation of the symbols and institutions of modern private 
markets economic globalization but now turned to use by states as 
primary economic actors.  The grannacional enterprises present a 
stark model of that updating and the embrace of modern forms of 
economic activity, but so does the ALBA bank.  ALBA suggests 
that private markets ought to be incidental to and fill in gaps in 
public market activity.  The engine that drives the economy is the 
state.  Integration under ALBA is merely another aspect of 
sovereign relations.  It should be directed to enhance rather than 
reduce national power over its internal and external economic 
policies and the production of economic activity.  But this presents 
a fundamental assumption completely incompatible with those on 
which the last half-century of economic integration has been based. 
Third, ALBA implicates the connections between the fight 
against the form of the current international system of economic 
regulation and the construction of trade frameworks.  Ideology 
matters; fundamentals and grounding assumptions about the 
operation of state and non-state actors, and their powers and 
 
297 See DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER: 
THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE 204–07 (2008) (discussing some of 
the restrictions on state power over economic activity). 
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prerogatives, matter.298  Indeed, ideology has been the principal 
motivator of much of what has been developed by the Cuban state 
apparatus.  Ideology drives implementation.  If one can control the 
ideological basis for the approach to an issue—like trade and 
investment—one can effectively control the parameters through 
which the issue is understood and systems constructed.  Ideology 
and ideological education may well be the principal aim of ALBA, 
at least in its initial stages of development.299  Ideology may well be 
its most important product—to the extent that through ALBA, the 
consensus assumptions about trade and investment might be 
modified.  ALBA represents a practical implementation of the 
ideological framework for the state system and the relationship of 
that system to economic regulation that the Cuban state has been 
developing since the 1970s.300  That framework emphasizes a focus 
on public commerce, on inter-governmentalism as the basis for 
integration, on attacking the private markets system and the 
privileging of private actors as controllers of economic decision-
making and on a shift back to public control over the economy at 
the state level.  It suggests that the basis for such activity is public 
rather than investor welfare, as determined by the state, and that 
all economic activity is tinged with a primary social rather than a 
more narrow economic purpose.  ALBA expresses these views in 
its four anti-capitalist values, in its schedule of objectives, in the 
corporate social responsibility framework of the grannacional 
(grandnational) enterprises and in the unequal barter 
arrangements at the heart of PetroCaribe. 
Intimately related to this is the conflation of economic and 
political goals inherent in ALBA.  This represents an inversion of 
the regulatory model that is fundamental for economic 
globalization.  Under that model, the clear divisions between 
public and private space is reflected in the separation between the 
political and economic spheres.  When states participate in 
markets, the expectation is that such participation is legitimate 
 
298 See The Battle for Latin America’s Soul, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2006, at 11 
(discussing the attention that Latin Americans have received for transforming 
their governments from liberal democracies into leftist nationalistic governments). 
299 See Max Azicri, ALBA y el Renacimiento de la Izquierda en la América Latina, 
DIÁLAGO, Summer 2008, at 3. 
300 See generally Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt, supra note 
13 (comparing the two opposing ideological perspectives for nation-states’ actions 
as creditors and debtors). 
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only when states act like an “idealized private investor.”301  
Likewise, when states operate through state owned enterprises, 
they are expected to organize in a way in which management is 
separated from political control.302  Conversely, private actors are 
supposed to exercise no significant political power.  ALBA 
presents a model grounded in the political use of economic power.  
More specifically, it represents an attempt to conflate the economic 
and political at the state level and, eventually, to unify public and 
private markets under the direction of the state.303 
Fourth, ALBA implicates the connections between anti-
Americanism and integration.  One of the great tragedies of Latin 
American integration has been its conflation, sometimes more, 
sometimes less powerfully, with a fear or loathing of the United 
States or its actions and policies.  It also reflects a related 
connection held by many of these states—that private markets 
based integration is a cover for western, and particularly 
American, neo-colonialist aggression, the object of which is to 
subordinate and exploit Latin American states indirectly to the 
same effect as under the old more direct colonial system.304  
Challenging the model of private markets based globalization is a 
way of challenging American power under the cover of the same 
issues that the Americans have been using to assert that power.  
The ferocious attack on the FTAA at the heart of the early ALBA 
 
301 See generally Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 279, at 1271 
(providing a general discussion of participation of states in markets). 
302 See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES (2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211 
.pdf. 
303 See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global 
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese 
Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing 
one version of this model closer to the current framework for economic 
development). 
304 On notions of neo-colonialism in general, see José E. Alvarez, Do States 
Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961 (2005); Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and 
Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of Development in a 
Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 221 (1994) (discussing its application to Latin 
American-U.S. relations); Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of 
Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL’Y 315 
(1996) (discussing notions of American neo-colonialism and private markets based 
globalization); Ibrahim J. Gassama, Africa and the Politics of Destruction: A Critical 
Re-Examination of Neocolonialism and Its Consequences, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 327, 359 
(2008) (arguing that neocolonialism promoted “the interests of domestic political 
elites while suppressing the emergence of truly emancipatory politics and 
progressive governance”). 
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efforts reflects this quite starkly.  The conflation of the FTAA and 
the United States provided a vehicle for the conflation of 
ideological and political opposition to a global set of factors tied to 
perceived American aspirations in the region the United States, the 
United States itself, private markets based globalization as an 
indirect challenge to assertions of American national power, and 
private markets as an attack by the United States on the power of 
newly decolonized states to direct and protect their internal 
economic life and set the policies thereof. 
Fifth, ALBA implicates the close connection between traditional 
models of Latin American integration and its challengers.  This 
connection implicates the importance of institutionalization models 
for the allocation of power even among state and supranational 
organizational actors and for the way those allocations of power 
among supranational endeavors cannot be avoided.  The 
traditional models, from that of the European Union to those of 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, represent, to varying degrees, efforts to 
institutionalize power within a supranational entity and, 
consequentially, to remove discretionary power over economic 
issues from states.  Clearly, the extent of that divergence of 
institutional governance power varies greatly, from the almost 
negligible shift in MERCOSUR to the substantial divestment of 
power among the member states of the European Union over those 
economic affairs set out in their respective organizational 
instruments.  ALADI, on the other hand, represents a different 
model—one that sacrifices virtually any framework for 
consolidating power in a supranational administrative or 
governance entity in favor of inter-governmentalism that is limited 
only by the values represented by the parties to the agreement.  
ALADI’s focus on partial trade agreements among diverse parties 
(for these agreements need not include all ALADI member states) 
finds its investment analogue in the growing number of bilateral 
investment treaties between ALADI member states and others.  But 
each of these is grounded in a consistent set of trade and 
investment assumptions.  ALBA presents a conscious inversion of 
the dominant private markets model on which contemporary trade 
and investment agreements are framed.  However, that inversion is 
grounded precisely in the forms adopted for the implementation of 
that model and its ultimate integrationist aspirations.  Both ALBA 
and ALADI present trade frameworks that serve as umbrellas for 
regional integration grounded in sector and nation specific layers 
of agreement that in the aggregate will achieve the desired 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
750 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
integrative result.305  Indeed, the partial trade agreements for 
which ALADI is famous is nicely mimicked by the current crop of 
ALBA projects—from the Bank of ALBA to the grannacional 
(grandnational) enterprises and efforts at monetary union.  
Likewise, the form of investment treaty finds echoes in PetroCaribe 
and even in the model of asymmetrical trading between different 
groups of ALBA states.  The inter-governmentalism of ALBA is the 
hallmark of ALADI. 
Sixth, ALBA implicates the tension between internal and 
external trade and investment frameworks.  This tension implicates 
the goals of solidarity among states, and the consequences of 
integration grounded in partial arrangements that distinguish 
among states, and groups of states.  This tension also implicates the 
tensions between mutual advantage and competition among states.  
Borders, even the borders of trade and investment arrangements 
include those within it and exclude those outside.  Those effects are 
sharply drawn within traditional private markets oriented trade 
and investment regimes, but they cannot be avoided under 
ALBA’s framework of multiple joint venture arrangements.  
Indeed, the tension is quite acute in the construction of ALBA 
simultaneously as an internal mechanism for trade among ALBA 
members and ALBA as an aggregation of trade with non-ALBA 
states.  These tensions are quite visible in relation to CARICOM, 
where there is ambiguity in ALBA’s position as either partner to, 
or a competitive and destabilizing force that would threaten 
CARICOM’s cohesion.306  But they are also visible within American 
 
305 ALADI, About ALADA: Who Are We, supra note 275.  
The judicial structure of ALADI is one of the most vigorous sub-regional 
agreements, plurilateral and bilateral integrations are increasingly 
emerging on the continent (Andean Community of Nations). 
Consequently, it is up to the Association—as an institutional and 
normative framework or “umbrella” for regional integration—to develop 
actions designed to help and promote these efforts in order to make them 
gradually converge to create a common economic space. 
Id.  
306 Vaughan A. Lewis, Professor of the Int’l Relations of the Caribbean, Third 
Sir Arthur Lewis Lecture in the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine’s  
2008 Nobel Laureate Celebrations, What Purposes for CARICOM Integration 
Today? 31–32 (Apr. 15, 2008), (transcript available at http://sta.uwi.edu 
/nlc/2008/documents/Lewis_Lecture_full.pdf. 
I have suggested in this lecture that the region is now due for a more 
deliberate and open discussion, initiated at the level of Heads of 
Government, of new purposes of integration in the new environment 
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policy grounded in free trade in the Americas except with Cuba.307  
Moreover, the relationship of ALBA’s state trade vehicles to 
outside markets may produce differences in outcome and 
operation from their internal constitution.  This will become 
particularly evident in coming years with respect to issues of 
sovereign immunity, conformity to foreign law, disclosure and 
transparency requirements beyond ALBA states, and the form and 
implementation of global corporate social responsibility rules that 
may be different from those developed within ALBA. 
Ultimately, all of these tensions and connections revolve can be 
reduced to a single issue—the character, effect and purpose of 
borders.  ALBA reminds us that these issues and connections are 
not limited to political borders—ideological, cultural, economic, 
class, gender, race, and ethnic borders can be as important, and as 
immersed in dialogues of integration, solidarity and respect.  They 
all play a critical role in the ways in which integration is 
understood and practiced.  But they also play an equally important 
role in the construction of hierarchy and in the subordination and 
exploitation of all such relationships.  ALBA represents another 
way of advancing the former and resisting the latter; but the 
borders that have confronted other efforts at integration within 
Latin America will also confront ALBA. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Several insights emerge strongly from this examination of 
ALBA.  ALBA is not merely a rhetorical device used for the 
internal consumption of the masses within the ALBA states.  Nor is 
it merely a propaganda construct for the projection of power 
 
which has come upon our countries and which I have sought to outline . 
. . 
 All this is required to take place at a time when, unlike the period of 
1973 and the commitment to the Treaty of Chaguaramas, the national 
realities are of differing levels of attributes and assets possessed or 
available to the particular states, and therefore of differing senses of 
strengths and weaknesses governing the options that they have at their 
disposal. The muted debate about this or that country’s attraction to 
Petrocaribe, or to the Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA), to the perceived 
detriment of existing regional commitments, is simply about that. 
Id. 
307 See generally David P. Fidler, LIBERTAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the 
Helms-Burton Act from within Liberal International Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 297 (1997). 
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beyond the borders of the ALBA states.  ALBA represents a 
conceptual space within which a group of states have been 
attempting to inject command economy concepts into the 
construction of a multilateral trade sphere.  It represents a 
sustained and potentially significant effort to find a principled 
basis for challenging the model of global economic governance that 
has served as the foundation of modern systems of trade. ALBA 
also represents an effort to blend political and economic concerns 
on a conventional Marxist Leninist model. ALBA’s substantially 
successful efforts to manage the Honduran constitutional crisis, 
provides a window on the character of those efforts.  But ALBA’s 
successes have been limited.  While it has built up its conceptual 
framework and been successful in exporting its ideas, at least 
regionally, it has had substantially less success in implementing its 
model on the ground.  That ALBA has been successful enough is 
due in large measure to the willingness of Venezuela to employ its 
petroleum resources.  But it has also succeeded because it provides 
a coherent foundation for a number of small states to band 
together against what they might perceive as a set of asymmetric 
power relations with other states.  Whether ALBA succeeds in the 
long run remains to be seen.  ALBA is critically important for states 
overwhelmed not only by other, more powerful states, but also 
states threatened by powerful private actors—from multinational 
corporations, to global civil society actors and international 
organizations.  That ALBA has the potential to disrupt the 
otherwise unimpeded development of privatized global 
governance frameworks is already a reality, and one that larger 
and influential states, like the United States, ignores at its long 
term peril. 
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